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BALANCING FUNDAMENTAL CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND THE NEED FOR
INCREASED HOMELAND SECURITY: THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11TH
KATHERINE RUZENSKI*
I. INTRODUCTION
An unfamiliar fear arose in the hearts of Americans after the
attacks of September 11, 2001.1 For the first time since World
War II, American citizens were demonstratively and successfully
attacked on American soil. 2 Shortly thereafter, the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, hereinafter the "USA
Patriot Act,"3 was enacted to combat and prevent this type of
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University, June 2005; B.A. Psychology, Stony Brook
University, June 2002. The author would like to thank her parents and brother for all
their love, wisdom, and support. She would also like to thank Professor R. Vischer and
the staff of the Journal of Legal Commentary for their assistance with this article.
1 See Jessica Ramirez, The Victim's Compensation Fund A Model for Future Mass
Casualty Situations, 29 TRANsp. L.J. 283, 283 (2002) (discussing how September llth
changed way Americans live); Dep't of Justice, USA Patriot Act Overview (discussing
September lth and its aftermath) available at http://www.lifeandliberty.gov
/patriot.overview.pversion.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004); see also Hon. Thomas H. Kean
& Hon. L. H. Hamilton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks: Public Statement
Release of 9/11 Commission Report (July 22, 2004) (stating that trauma of 9/11 turned
international world order upside down) available at http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/
report/91 lreport statement.pdf.
2 See John B. Mitchell, "Preemptive War" Is it Constitutional?, 44 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 497, 501 (2004) (discussing planned attacks of World War II on American soil); Lori
Sachs, Comment, September 11, 2001: The Constitution During Crisis: A New Perspective,
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1715, 1715 (2002) (stating that September 11 was worst attack on
American soil); see also Danielle Tarin, Note, Will an Attack on America Justify an Attack
on Americans?: Congressional and Constitutional Prohibitions on the Executive's Power to
Detain U.S. Citizens as Enemy Combatants, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 1145, 1146 (2004)
(explaining that sixty years after Americans were attacked during World War II, they
were again attacked on September 11, 2001).
3 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, 107 P.L. 56, (2001).
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terrorism from occurring again. 4 This act reflected the American
desire to increase homeland security, recognized as so imperative
immediately following September 11, 2001.5
On October 31, 2001, only five days after the USA Patriot Act
was enacted, Attorney General Ashcroft enacted an interim
amendment to the Bureau of Prisons regulations, without the
usual public comment period, 6 in an effort to once again heighten
homeland security. 7 Civil libertarians claimed that by enacting
both the USA Patriot Act and the Bureau of Prisons regulations
in the month following the September 1 1 th attacks, the
government acted too swiftly, out of fear that another terrorist
attack was imminent.8 The Bureau of Prisons amendment was
4 See Lawrence M. Lebowitz & Ira L. Podheiser, A Summary of the Changes in
Immigration Policies and Practices After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: The
USA Patriot Act and Other Measures, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 873, 875 (2002) (identifying
Patriot Act as major piece of crime fighting legislation); John Podesta, USA Patriot Act-
The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset, HUMAN RIGHTS (Winter 2002) (stating that the
Patriot Act is a sound effort to provide new tools to combat terrorism) available at
http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winterO2/podesta.html; see also Tammy J. Schemmel, Justice
in a Changed World: www.stopcybercrime.com: How the USA Patriot Act Combats Cyber-
Crime, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 921, 926 (2003) (explaining how Patriot Act combats
terrorism by regulating statutes that deal with technology).
5 See Dep't of Justice, USA Patriot Act Overview (recognizing importance of USA
Patriot Act in protecting citizens today) available at http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/
patriotLoverview-pversion.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).; see also Kathryn Martin, The
USA Patriot Act's Application to Library Patron Records, 29 J. LEGIS. 283, 285 (2003)
(stating that Congress hurriedly passed Patriot Act after September 11th); Schemmel,
supra note 4, at 925 (discussing how President Bush signed Patriot Act into law just six
weeks after September 11th attacks).
6 See Dep't. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 66 FED. REG. 55062 (Oct. 31, 2001) (to be
codified 28 C.F.R. pt. 500, 501) (explaining necessity to put rule into effect immediately);
Marjorie Cohn, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: The Evisceration of the Attorney-
Client Privilege in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2003)
(stating that this rule took effect five days after Patriot Act without public comment
period); see also Joseph W. Yockey, Note, The Case For A Sixth Amendment Public-Safety
Exception After Dickerson, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 501, 508 (2004) (explaining how Justice
Department stated swiftness as necessary).
r See Rules and Regulations, -Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. §§
500, 501 (2002) (explaining the purpose of the act); Avidan Y. Cover, Note, A Rule Unfit
for all Seasons: Monitoring Attorney-Client Communications Violates Privilege and the
Sixth Amendment, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2002) (discussing how rule allows for
monitoring of communication between inmates and their attorneys); see also Sharon
Jeffrey, An Act of Patriotism? Infringing on the Individual's Sixth Amendment Right to
Effective Counsel, 33 Sw. U. L. REV. 165, 166-67 (2004) (stating that rule allows
monitoring of all communications between inmates and their attorneys if Attorney
General certifies that "reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an inmate may use
communication with attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of violence or
terrorism" (quoting National Security: Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66
Fed. Reg. 55062-01, 55062 (proposed Oct. 26, 2001) (codified in 28 C.F.R. 501.2, 501.3
(2001)))).
8 See Michael F. Dowley, Note, Government Surveillance Powers Under the USA
Patriot Act: Is It Possible to Protect National Security and Privacy at the Same Time? A
Constitutional Tug-of-War, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 165, 165 (2002) (stating George W.
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also criticized as a frontal attack on the attorney-client
privilege. 9 Since their enactment, the USA Patriot Act and the
Bureau of Prisons regulation have been heavily scrutinized as
taking away fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.10
This Note will specifically examine the amendment to the
Bureau of Prisons regulation, 28 C.F.R. 501.3,11 and its effect on
the attorney-client privilege after September 11, 2001. First, the
Note will discuss the purpose and long-standing policy
supporting the attorney-client privilege, including those
limitations on the privilege that have already been recognized in
American jurisprudence. Next, this Note will analyze the new
interpretation of the attorney-client privilege under the
amendment to the Bureau of Prisons regulations. The views of
civil libertarians and government critics will be discussed,
identifying their concerns for the need to balance individual
rights against the need for national security. United States v.
Sattar,12 the lead case questioning the effect of the Bureau of
Prisons regulation on the attorney-client privilege, will also be
analyzed. The Note will conclude that the Bureau of Prisons
regulation as applied, including the changes to the contours of
Bush signed Act on October 26, 2001, which was later criticized heavily by judicial
scholars and political activists); Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties:
The USA Patriot Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 934 (2002) (explaining how Patriot
Act chips away at rights protected by Fourth Amendment of Untied States Constitution);
see also Jeremy C. Smith, The USA Patriot Act: Violating Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy Protected by the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing National Security, 82
N.C. L. REV. 412, 412 (2003) (discussing that Congress acted swiftly when passing Patriot
Act).
9 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1241-42 (recognizing attorney-client privilege has been
infringed upon); Cover, supra note 7, at 1234 (stating that new rule violates attorney-
client privilege and Sixth Amendment); Kristen V. Cunningham & Jessica L. Srader,
Comment, The Post 9-11 War On Terrorism... What Does It Mean For the Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 4 WYO. L. REV. 311, 325 (2004) (explaining how this rule has significant impact
on trust which is necessary aspect of attorney-client privilege).
10 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1241-42 (2003) (stating that new Bureau of Prisons rule
is frontal assault on Constitution); see also Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal
Law Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault On The Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why It Is
Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 551 (2003) (recognizing how President of ABA
condemned new Bureau of Prisons regulation as violating right to counsel and to be free
from unreasonable search and seizures guaranteed by Constitution); Donald A. Downs &
Erik Kinnunen, Symposium Issue, Civil Liberties In A Time Of Terror, Article, A Response
to Anthony Lewis: Civil Liberties in A New Kind of War, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 385, 385 (2003)
(explaining civil liberties have been under attack since September 11th, including use of
attorney-client privilege).
11 See Rules and Regulations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. §§
500, 501 (2002).
12 No. 02 Cr. 395, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003).
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the attorney-client privilege, properly balances fundamental civil
liberties and the need for increased homeland security demanded
by the American public after September 11, 2001.
II. ROOTS OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRMLEGE
A. Purpose and Policy
It is important to understand the purpose and the policy
behind the long-standing attorney-client privilege to better grasp
whether or not this privilege has been restricted or infringed
upon. The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest privileges
based in common law.13 Cases recognizing the privilege have
been reported as far back as the 1500s, during the reign of
Elizabeth I in England.14 Many scholars argue that the premise
for the attorney-client privilege can also be found in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.15 Due to the rich
history of the privilege, it has been recognized as one of the most
appreciated and respected privileges in American
13 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (describing attorney-
client privilege as oldest of confidential communications known in common law); see also
Paul A. Gordon, Note, Evidence/Professional Responsibility-Life After Death: The
Attorney-Client Privilege - Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998), 72
TEMP. L. REV. 493, 493 (1999) (stating that attorney-client privilege is oldest and most
recognized privilege for confidential communications); Julie Peters Zamacona, Evidence
and Ethics-Letting the Client Rest in Peace: Attorney-Client Privilege Survives the Death
of the Client, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998), 21 U. ARK. LIrrLE
ROCK L. REV. 277, 280 (1999) (stating that attorney-client privilege is oldest of
confidential communication privileges).
14 See David B. Canning, Comment, Privileged Communications in Ohio and What's
New on the Horizon: Ohio House Bill 52 Accountant-Client Privilege, 31 AKRON L. REV.
505, 557 n.39 (1998) (explaining that attorney-client privilege emerged in English courts
during reign of Elizabeth I, although its origins can be traced back to Roman times); see
also Lieutenant Colonel Norman K. Thompson, USAF & Captain Joshua E Kastenberg,
USAF, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Practical Military Applications of a Professional
Core Value, 49 A.F. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (quoting scholar Dean John Wigmore's statement
that during time of Elizabeth I, attorney-client privilege was unquestioned). See generally
American College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 311 (2002)
(giving background on privilege, including reign of Elizabeth I).
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (listing rights of accused in criminal prosecutions); see
also Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1413 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that District Court
has interpreted Sixth Amendment to include broad attorney-client privilege); H. Lowell
Brown, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Context of
Corporate Counseling, 87 KY. L.J. 1191, 1269 n.5 (1998-99) (citing various views on.
attorney-client privilege, including that this privilege is within client's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights).
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jurisprudence.16 However, in interpreting the Federal Rule of
Evidence 501,17 the Supreme Court noted that the privilege must
be viewed "in light of reason and experience,"18 and therefore,
will adapt and change to reflect technological advancements and
society's views in modern times.19
The attorney-client privilege protects all information and
communications shared between an attorney and a client to
obtain and render legal advice as confidential, subject to a few
exceptions. 20 The purpose of the privilege is to promote full and
frank communications between attorney and client, so that the
client receives the best legal advice possible. 21 Therefore, the
privilege is a necessary building block in ensuring that justice is
16 See Neil E. Herman, Note, Who Controls the Attorney-Client Privilege in
Bankruptcy?, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 549, 549 (1985) (noting privilege as most respected
privilege in common law for confidential communications); see also Marion J. Radson &
Elizabeth A. Waratuke, The Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges of Government
Entities, 30 STETSON L. REv. 799, 799 (2001) (beginning article by stating that attorney-
client privilege is most respected privilege in legal profession); Thompson & Kastenberg,
supra note 14 at 64 (stating attorney-client privilege is most universally respected of
testimonial privileges).
17 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (asserting privileges).
18 FED. R. EVID. 501.
19 See Dowley, supra note 8, at 165 (recognizing changes to certain rights under
Patriot Act have just changed due to technological advancement and allowing government
to adapt their practices to these advancements); Amy M. Fulmer Stevenson, Comment,
Making a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhighway: Electronic Mail, the Attorney-
Client Privilege and Inadvertent Disclosure, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 347, 365 (1997)
(explaining that larger firms will be able to keep up with technological advancements,
such as cryptography, to maintain security of attorney-client privilege, while smaller
firms that are unable to afford such advancements will risk disclosure and loss of
privilege); see also Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The
Peril and the Promise, 49 DuKE L.J. 147, 155 (1999) (discussing that growth of legal
advice websites on which laypersons ask questions and attorneys will answer for fees
acknowledges emergence of attorney-client relationship while using disclaimers to limit
duties owed to cyberclients).
20 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (specifying that attorney-
client privilege is oldest of confidential communications known to common law);
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Massaro, 47 Fed. Appx. 618, 618 (3d Cir. 2002) (adding that
an attorney's broader duty of confidentiality covers not only communications with his
client, but also information relating to representation of that client, regardless of source).
But see United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2003) (defining
attorney-client privilege as protecting only communications made by client to his lawyer).
21 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (noting that such open communication promotes
broader public interests in observance of law); Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
861 P.2d 895, 908 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1993) (declaring that purpose of attorney-client
privilege is to foster attorney-client relationship by enabling attorneys to provide best
advice possible to their clients, and that this privilege allows clients to provide
information without fearing it will be used against them in future); Horon Holding Corp.
v. McKenzie, 775 A.2d 111, 115 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (explaining intention of
attorney-client privilege is to encourage client to freely and fully disclose information so
he receives attorney's best advice in return).
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served.22  Lawyers can only provide the best and most
appropriate legal advice when their clients make full disclosures
to them. 23 Unfortunately, clients are often inhibited from
speaking the whole truth.24 Often, the lawyer's credentials of a
higher education and superior legal skills may intimidate a
client. 25 Other times, the rumors and stigma that surrounds the
legal profession may make the client wary of trusting their
lawyer. Either way, without the assurance of the attorney-client
privilege, clients would never tell the entire story to their lawyer,
which would make it impossible to provide proper and effective
legal assistance. 26 By ensuring the client that the attorney must
keep certain information confidential, it allows the client to
22 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 412 (1998) (noting that
attorney-client privilege should only operate where "necessary to achieve its purpose");
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (stating rationale for privilege as long recognized); see also
Joshua K. Simko, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure, The Attorney-Client Privilege, and Legal
Ethics: An Examination and Suggestion for Alaska, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 461, 471 (2002)
(discussing "no waiver" approach to attorney-client privilege).
23 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (discussing purpose of attorney-client privilege);
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (explaining that in order for attorney's
professional privilege to be carried out, client must fully disclose information relating to
his reasons for seeking counsel); Susan J. Stabile, Sarbanes-Oxley's Rules of Professional
Responsibility Viewed Through a Sextonian Lens, 60 N.Y.U. ANNUAL SURVEY AM. L. 31,
44 (2004) (quoting letter from American Bar Association).
24 See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client
Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L. J. 203, 268
(1992) (commenting that' most likely reason for client's avoidance of fully disclosing
information in child protection case is fear of revealing ambiguous but potentially
damaging conduct); Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary?, 15
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477, 504 (2002) (stating that even with existence of privilege,
clients are inhibited from being completely open with their attorneys for reasons besides
fear of disclosure); Robert N. Treiman, Comment, Inter-Lawyer Communication and the
Prevention of Client Fraud: A Look Back at O.P.M., 34 UCLA L. REV. 925, 945 (1987)
(explaining that purpose of privilege is to encourage full disclosure and that removal of
privilege will inhibit client's willingness to provide information).
25 See Scott Daniels, The President's Message: A Prayer for the Professions, 15 UTAH
BAR J. 6, 6 (2002) (discussing fact that it is embarrassing to legal profession when lawyers
attempt to use their titles and skills to intimidate others in day to day situations); Wayne
Schiess, Department: Plain Language: When Your Boss Wants it the Old Way, 80 MICH.
BAR J. 68, 68 (2001) (noting that many lawyers still use archaic, overly formal tones in
their documents because they believe it might intimidate their clients); see also Paul
Cheston, Solicitors are Told to Outlaw Gobbledygook, EVENING STANDARD (London), Mar.
17, 2003, at 16 (stating that some lawyers use Latin and old English to impress their
clients, when in fact this only confuses and intimidates them).
26 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (noting that purpose of privilege is to encourage
clients to make full disclosures to their attorneys); see also Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S.
464, 470 (1888) (explaining that attorney-client privilege is based on necessity that client
not be apprehensive about disclosing any information, so that there can be proper
administration of justice).
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speak freely. 27 In return, the client receives better legal advice
and administration of justice is served.28
B. Narrow Interpretation
The privilege generally provides absolute protection of
attorney-client communications, unless waived by the client.29
However, it is also important to note that the privilege is
interpreted narrowly because it inhibits the truth seeking
process. 30 In certain instances, the privilege must yield to more
prominent concerns. Such instances arise, for example, in
criminal trials, when a criminal defendant's constitutional rights
are at stake, or when the need for the probative evidence
protected by the privilege outweighs the need to invoke the
attorney-client privilege protection. 31
The crime-fraud exception is another example which illustrates
the narrow interpretation of the attorney-client privilege. 32 When
an attorney's services are being used to facilitate and further
criminal or fraudulent activity, attorneys have permission to
break the confidences of their client to prevent that activity from
27 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (stating purpose of confidentiality is to promote full
conversation between attorneys and clients); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 403 (1976) (discussing that clients must be able to speak openly with their
attorneys).
28 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (stating that lawyer can provide informed legal advice
because of client disclosures); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (explaining that privilege helps
promote administration of justice).
29 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998) (stating that
confidential communications are privileged during client's lifetime); see also Fisher 425
U.S. at 403 (explaining that disclosures from client to attorney, in order to get legal
assistance, are privileged); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d
1414, 1424 (3d Cir. 1991) (announcing that privilege gives absolute protection and
discusses standards to waive privilege).
30 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (stating privilege should only be used when absolutely
necessary); United States v. Goldfarb 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1964) (explaining that
privilege does not extend to all aspects of attorney client relationship).
31 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (stating that privilege is
superceded by need for evidence); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974)
(holding that right to probe testimony outweighed privilege); United States v. Sattar, No.
02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164, at *54 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 15, 2003) (deciding
that privilege must yield to discovery obligations).
32 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1239 (exemplifying crime-fraud exception to attorney-
client privilege); Geraldine Gauthier, Dangerous Liaisons: Attorney-Client Privilege, The
Crime-Fraud Exception, ABA Model Rule 1.6 and Post-September 11 Counter-Terrorist
Measures, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 351, 351 (2002) (stating that crime-fraud exception can be
intrusive); Stuart M. Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: Eroding
Confidentiality in Federal Health Care Law, 51 ALA. L. REV. 163, 185 (1999) (explaining
that crime-fraud exception can cancel privilege).
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occurring. 33 In cases such as these, a judge will determine
whether the government has made a prima facie case as to
whether the attorney facilitating the crime. 34 If the judge finds
that the client is trying to use the lawyer's services to commit a
criminal or fraudulent act, the court will pierce those attorney-
client communications. 35 The privilege will therefore not apply
and the communications will not be protected.
The main goal of the privilege is to assure that a client's
communications with his or her attorney are protected, and the
privilege should only be asserted for this purpose. 36 By applying
the privilege broadly, it significantly decreases the amount of
information disclosed in discovery. 37 This may mislead or confuse
the jury, and effectively hinder their truth-seeking function. 38
Therefore, the attorney-client privilege is interpreted narrowly
and only applied to promote full disclosure between the client
and the attorney, ensuring that the client receive the best
available legal advice. 39
33 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1239 (clarifying purpose of crime fraud exception);
Gauthier, supra note 32, at 352 (explaining that there are circumstances when lawyer can
disclose client confidences); Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 32, at 185 (stating privilege
can be cancelled if government can prove legal advice was sought to further crime).
34 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1239 (stating that government must make prima facie
case that client sought out lawyer to obtain assistance in crime); Gauthier, supra note 32,
at 355 (noting that there must be prima facie evidence before privilege is cancelled);
Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 32, at 186 (specifying that focus must be on subjective
intent of client).
35 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1239 (explaining judge's role in determination of
whether or not privilege should be pierced); Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 32, at 187-88
(noting that risk of privilege is largely up to view of trial judge).
36 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that clients must be
free of apprehension of disclosure in order to ensure justice); In re Sarrio S.A., No. M 9-
372, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14822, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1995) (explaining that policy
favors open discussion between attorney and client); Cohn, supra note 6, at 1238 (stating
purposes of privilege).
37 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404 (1976) (stating that documents that
are privileged do not have to be produced at discovery); Brandon Bortner & Douglas
Miller, Procedural Issues, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 972 (2003) (explaining that privilege
shields communications from forced discovery); Gauthier, supra note 32, at 354-55
(noting that privilege is exception to disclosure requirements).
38 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (explaining that an effect of privilege is withholding of
evidence from fact finder); CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 87 (John W.
Strong ed., West 5th ed., 1999) (discussing effects of privilege).
39 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (explaining that purpose of privilege does not require
broader rule); In re Application of Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting
that privilege is applied only when necessary); Bortner & Miller, supra note 37, at 974
(stating that there are strict limits to privilege).
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III. THE BUREAU OF PRISONS REGULATIONS AMENDMENT:
RECOGNIZING A NEED TO MONITOR CERTAIN ATTORNEY-CLIENT
COMMUNICATIONS
A. Before the Amendment
On June 20, 1997, the Bureau of Prisons finalized interim
regulation, Section 28 CFR 501.3,40 authorizing special
administrative measures, or SAMs, on a specialized group of
inmates that presented a danger of disclosing information to
third parties that could result in death or serious bodily injury to
persons. 41 The rule provided that the Attorney General, or the
head of a federal law enforcement or intelligence agency, could
make a written determination of whether specific inmates caused
this particular type of threat. 42 The inmates were able to seek
review of any of the special administrative measures imposed by
the regulation.43 Examples of these SAMs include housing in
administrative detention, or limiting certain privileges such as
visiting, correspondence, and use of the telephone.44
40 Rules and Regulations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3
(2002) (explaining general management and administration behind regulation
implemented for prevention of acts of violence and terrorism).
41 See United States v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 621 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that SAM's
could also be authorized if there was danger of "substantial damage to property that
would entail the risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons" occurring); see also Al-
Owhali v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 13, 16 (D.C. 2003) (noting that SAM imposes various
restrictions on inmates); cf. Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting
that SAM's are infrequently used).
42 See 28 C.F.R. §501.3 (explaining who may authorize Warden to implement these
policies); see also Reid, 369 F.3d at 620 (explaining that this regulation "permits the
Attorney General, who has plenary power over the management of federal prisons... to
impose on any individual prisoner 'special administrative measures that are reasonably
necessary to protect persons against the risk of death or serious bodily injury"); United
States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164, at *13 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 15,
2003) (noting how Attorney General decides on information brought to him by federal
officers).
43 See Yousef, 254 F.3d at 1219 (noting that even though prisoner may challenge
administrative measures, "no action can be brought under federal law until the prisoner
has exhausted 'administrative remedies as are available"') (citations omitted); see also
Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that prisoner can "only
exhaust administrative remedies that are actually available"); United States v. Johnson,
223 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that "these restrictions may, however, be
imposed only in 120-day increments; and each time, before they can be reimposed, the
warden must conduct the risk determination afresh").
44 See 28 C.F.R. §501.3 (noting that SAM also contains provisions prohibiting
plaintiff from communicating with news media); see also Reid, 369 F.3d at 621 (noting
that "the affected prisoner must be notified of the SAMs and the basis for their
imposition"); Al-Owhali, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (explaining that these restrictions are
designed to prevent acts of violence and terrorism).
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Before the amendment to the Department of Justice Bureau of
Prisons rule in 2001,45 the attorney-client privilege protected all
confidential communications between the attorney and the
inmate that were made in order to obtain and render legal
advice. 46 Under the crime-fraud exception, if the government
had a reasonable suspicion that communication between the
attorney and the client were being used to plot a violent crime or
terrorist activity, the law enforcement agencies' only remedy was
to go to court and have a judge determine if there was probable
cause to pierce those communications to prevent that violent
crime or terrorist activity. This was so, even when the threat
was life-endangering and imminent.47
Much like drug-kingpins, and mob consiglieres, al-Qaeda had
been known to use their attorney prison visits to relay
information to the outside. 48 An "al-Qaeda terrorism manual
[was] obtained overseas that urged members to take advantage of
prison visits to communicate useful information to the outside."49
This included prison visits with co-conspirators or even the
45 See Rules and Regulations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 .C.F.R. §§
500, 501 (2002) (listing rules that are to be followed by prisons within United States); see
also Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55062 (Oct. 31, 2001) 2001
WL 134043 (explaining need for new changes in amendment).
46 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that purpose of
attorney-client privilege "is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice"); see also Fisher v. United States. 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)
(stating "Privilege's purpose is to facilitate full disclosure by client"); Hunt v. Blackburn,
128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (explaining rationale behind privilege, namely that "assistance
can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the
apprehension of disclosure").
47 See United States v. Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that "a
party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception must at least demonstrate that there is
probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud has been attempted or committed and that
the communications were in furtherance thereof"); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984) (explaining that for exception to apply, crime
or fraud need to be intended, yet do not have to occur); see also In re Bankamerica Corp.
Secs. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that client's intent to further crime
is what must be shown).
48 See Adam Cohen, Rough Justice, The Attorney General has Powerful New Tools to
Fight Terrorism. Has He Gone Too Far?, TIME, Dec. 10, 2001, at 30 (commenting on
debate between those who find these prison visit restrictions as necessary tools for war on
terrorism, and those who find these restrictions as sharp curtailment of civil liberty); see
also Robert Gearty, Terror Attorney Ruse Aided Sheik: Feds, DAILY NEWS (New York),
Aug. 25, 2004, at 13 (describing "one radical attorney's role in allowing her client's
follower to get information to him in prison'). See generally Diane K. Hook, Detainees or
Prisoners of War?: The Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the War on Terrorism, 58
J. MO. B. 346, 349 (2002) (describing al-Queda members and fighters).
49 Cohen, supra note 48, at 30.
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inmates' lawyers.50 The manual created a dangerous situation in
times where a terrorism attack could occur at any moment. 51 In
order to protect Americans against terrorists using their
strategy, the Department of Justice amended the Bureau of
Prisons Regulation under the advisement of Attorney General
John Ashcroft.52
B. After the Amendment
The amendment enacted in 2001 did not change the standards
for the implementation of the special administrative
procedures. 53 However, the rule recognized the threat that many
inmates participated in furthering acts of violence and terrorism
through communication with associates while in detention
facilities. 54 The Bureau of Prisons believed that it was possible
50 See United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003) (discussing prison visits which were monitored); Cohen,
supra note 48, at 30 (noting that "only 16 of the 158,000 inmates in the federal system
have been assigned the special administrative status that makes them eligible for
monitoring"); see also United States v. Sabadu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1322 (7th Cir. 1989)
(noting that in order to "establish the crime of conspiracy, the government must prove
that there is an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act, that
a defendant is a party to the agreement, and that an overt act is committed in furtherance
of the agreement by one of the co-conspirators").
51 See generally Corporate Security Chiefs Favor Bush, WHITE HOUSE BULLETIN,
Sept. 20, 2004 (noting that sixty eight percent of those polled recently thought terrorist
act was likely to occur before upcoming election); John Deane & Jane Merrick,
Government Needs Anti-Terror Minister-Tories, PRESS ASS'N, Dec. 3, 2002 (commenting on
quote from someone in Britain's government who uttered that "it must be admitted that
we cannot actually prevent a terrorist attack"); John J. Goldman, The World; Honoring
Memory of Sept.11 Victims, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at 8 (explaining why we will
always fear terrorism attack).
52 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that "the government has a legitimate interest in preventing the spread of
international terrorism, and there is no doubt that that interest is substantial"); Cohen,
supra note 48, at 30 (noting skepticism that" many of these new rules "could help to
easily use surveillance on "ordinary Americans"); see also Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16164, at *6 (clarifying that "28 C.F.R. § 501.3 clearly authorized Attorney General and
Bureau of Prisons to implement SAMs").
53 But see Cohn, supra note 6, at 1242 (stating that "Ashcroft replaced the standard
of 'probable cause' . . . with the lesser 'reasonable suspicion' standard" with respect to
application of special administrative procedures); Gauthier, supra note 32, at 371
(describing amendment to Bureau of Prisons rule as allowing Attorney General to monitor
inmates' attorney-client communications on basis of "reasonable suspicion"); Steven R.
Shapiro, Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 90 GEO. L. J. 1087, 1091
(2002) (noting that "reasonable suspicion" standard "falls short of the traditional probable
cause standard").
54 See Teri Dobbins, Protecting the Unpopular from the Unreasonable: Warrantless
Monitoring of Attorney Client Communications in Federal Prisons, 53 CATH. U. L. REV.
295, 301-02 (2004) (stating that purpose of amendment allowing monitoring of attorney-
client communications is to "deter inmates from committing future acts that could result
in death or serious bodily injury"); Gauthier, supra note 32, at 371 (quoting Attorney
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that inmates passed on messages to attorneys, facilitating
terrorist activity. 55 The amended rule provided that under
certain circumstances, communications between the attorney and
the inmate could be monitored when it was necessary to deter
future acts of violence or terrorism.56
The Bureau of Prisons regulation now gives more authority to
the Attorney General to pierce the attorney-client privilege under
necessary circumstances. 57  If the attorney general has a
"reasonable suspicion" that the lawyer-client communications are
being used to facilitate acts of violence or terrorism, law
enforcement officials can listen in on those conversations. 58
However, there is a checks and balances process within the
amendment. Although there is no longer judicial review to
determine if the communications are being used for terrorism,
General's testimony that imprisoned terrorists were instructed to "communicate with
brothers outside prison" to facilitate acts of terrorism); see also Shapiro, supra note 53, at
1091 (describing government's fear that inmates will use communication with their
attorneys to further acts of terrorism as justification for amended rule).
55 See Dobbins, supra note 54, at 301-02 (stating that purpose of amendment
allowing monitoring of attorney-client communications); see also Gauthier, supra note 32,
at 371 (describing Attorney General's views that terrorists were exploiting American
judicial process by communications between attorneys and prisoners). See generally
Shapiro, supra note 53, at 1091 (stating how in midst of national crisis, "it is an
understandable impulse to give the government whatever authority it seeks").
56 See Rules and Regulations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. §§
500, 501.3(d)(2)(i) (2002) (stating that inmate-attorney communications may be monitored
to prevent future acts of terrorism); Cohn, supra note 6, at 1242 (noting that under
amended rule, attorney-client communications can be monitored if reasonable suspicion
exists to believe that "an inmate may use communications with attorneys ... to
further ... acts of violence or terrorism"); see also John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden,
Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security" A Constitutional Analysis of the
USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L.
REV. 1081, 1116 (2002) (stating that under amended rule, communications between
"prisoners and their attorneys may be monitored if Attorney General" certifies existence
of reasonable suspicion to believe inmate may use communications with their attorney to
further acts of violence).
57 See Rules and Regulations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. §§
500, 501.3 (d) (2002) (noting Attorney General's authority to provide for monitoring of
attorney-inmate communications on basis of reasonable suspicion); Cohn, supra note 6, at
1242 (stating that under Bureau of Prisons regulation as amended, attorney-client
communications can be intercepted on Attorney General's finding of reasonable suspicion
as opposed to probable cause that an inmate may be using attorney-client
communications to further acts of terrorism). See generally Whitehead & Aden, supra note
56, at 1116 (arguing language of regulation is broad and vests Attorney General with
considerable discretion).
58 See Rules and Regulations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. §§
500, 501.3 (d) (2002) (discussing reasonable suspicion standard that Attorney General
uses); see also Cohn, supra note 6, at 1242 (describing reasonable suspicion standard that
must be satisfied to intercept attorney-client communications). See generally Whitehead
& Aden, supra note 56, at 1116 (stating that communication between an inmate and his
or her attorney may be monitored if "reasonable suspicion" standard is met).
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there is a separate group of monitoring attorneys called the
"privilege team," separate from the prosecution team, which
listen to and evaluate the communications and weed out any
privileged confidential information that is not the subject of
furthering crime or terrorism. 59 Therefore, the prosecution team
is not given access to any information that is not used to
facilitate violent or terrorist activity.
Additionally, written and advanced notice must be given to the
inmate and her attorney before any monitoring occurs. 60 These
safeguards provide that the inmates' rights in regard to the
attorney-client privilege are protected and that the intrusion of
privileged material and conversations is minimal. 61 Any
information collected, which is not relevant to the acts of violence
or terrorism, cannot permissibly be used against the inmate in
the current prosecution. 62
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE REGULATION BY THE CIVIL LIBERTARIANS
Civil libertarians have heavily criticized the procedure under
the Bureau of Prisons regulation. 63 First, they claim that the
59 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1243 (describing privilege team's responsibility of
reviewing intercepted attorney-client communications to determine what constitutes
properly privileged materials). But see Shapiro, supra note 53, at 1091 (describing
government eavesdropping on attorney-client communications through amended rule as
undermining separation of powers principle). See generally Jeffrey Collins, Patriot Act
Fights Terrorism While Protecting Rights, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 25, 2003, at 14A (arguing
amendment combats terrorism efficiently).
60 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1243 (describing notice requirement); see also Shapiro,
supra note 53, at 1091 (stating that notice requirement requires inmate and his or her
attorney be provided written notification of government's intent to monitor their
communications). See generally Collins, supra note 59, at 14A (arguing efficiency of
amendment against terrorism).
61 See Gauthier, supra note 32, at 371 (characterizing notice requirement as a
safeguard of attorney-client communications). But see Cohn, supra note 6, at 1243 (stating
attorney-client privilege is compromised even if notice is given); Shapiro, supra note 53, at
1091 (claiming that notice requirement fails to remedy fundamental invasion of attorney-
client privilege).
62 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1243 (describing requirement that properly privileged
materials not be retained); see also Gauthier, supra note 32, at 372 (stating that "except
for the information indicating imminent threats, no other information gleaned from the
monitoring may be ...... used for any ...... purpose"). See generally Collins, supra note
59, at 14A (arguing that amendment combats terrorism efficiently).
63 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1242-43 (asserting attorney-client privilege is eroded by
amendment); Dobbins, supra note 54, at 303 (noting that civil libertarians have criticized
amended Bureau of Prisons regulation as violative of First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and
Fourteenth amendment rights of inmates); see also Gauthier, supra note 32, at 374
(stating that ACLU has described amended Bureau of Prisons Regulation as "deeply
troubling").
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"privilege team," as set out in the regulation, is not defined. 64
This leaves open the question of what attorneys or other officials
are qualified to sit on the "privilege team," and who will have the
responsibility to decide what information will be left
confidential. 65 The rule states that a "privilege team" will be
"designated, consisting of individuals not involved in the
underlying investigation."66 But the rule does not specify where
the line will be drawn to establish a conflict of interest,
disallowing an attorney to participate on the team. Critics
believe this is an ultimate hazard that provides potential for
misuse and abuse under the regulation. 67 All this regulation
does, in their minds, is to add another tool to the Department of
Justice's belt, allowing them to overstep the boundaries of their
prosecutorial role.6 8
Second, the civil libertarians complain that there is no judicial
oversight and no meaningful standard to evaluate the opinions of
64 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1243 (stating that amended rule does not identify or
describe qualifications of "privilege team"); J. Soffiyah Elijah, The Reality of Political
Prisoners in the United States: What September 11 Taught Us About Defending Them, 18
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 129, 137 (2002) (describing privilege team only as consisting of
individuals not involved in underlying investigation); see also Ellen S. Podgor & John
Wesley Hall, Government Surveillance of Attorney-Client Communications: Invoked in the
Name of Fighting Terrorism, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 145, 154-55 (2003) (describing
privilege team as government designated and operated).
65 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1243 (stating "privilege team" not sufficiently described
by amended rule); Elijah, supra note 64, at 137 (describing who fits into "privilege team");
see also Podgor & Hall, supra note 64, at 154-55 (describing privilege team).
66 Rules and Regulations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. §§ 500,
501 (2002).
67 See Stuart Taylor Jr., False Alarm: Overblown Fears About Patriot Act Searches
Obscure Real Liberties Abuses at Guantanamo, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at 60 (stating
civil libertarians feel that USA Patriot Act and those other tools given to Department of
Justice will be used against ordinary criminal defendants, not just those involved in
terrorism); see also Steven J. Enwright, Note, The Department of Justice Guidelines to
Law Office Searches: The Need to Replace the 'Trojan Horse" Privilege Team with Neutral
Judicial Review, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1855, 1871 (1997) (stating that "idea behind the
privilege team is to keep privileged material out of hands of the hands of the prosecuting
government attorneys"). See generally Jan C. Ting, Unobjectionable But Insufficient -
Federal Initiatives in Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 34 CONN. L. REV.
1145, 1151 (2002) (explaining that privilege teams are engaged in monitoring and are
separated from prosecuting attorneys to insure that no information obtained through
monitoring would be introduced at trial against detainees).
68 See Taylor, supra note 67, at 60 (reiterating that civil libertarians are concerned
that tools given to Department of Justice will be used against ordinary criminal
defendants); see also Enwright, supra note 67, at 1872 (stating that although Department
of Justice guidelines acknowledge volatility inherent in law office search, some
commentators argue that these guidelines do not satisfactorily protect integrity of
attorney-client privilege). See generally Ting, supra note 67, at 1151 (stating that
Department of Justice "published an interim rule authorizing the monitoring of attorney-
client communications of detainees").
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the Attorney General or "privilege team" as to what should be
confidential. 69 Further, the Attorney General has the sole
authority to determine whether there is a "reasonable suspicion"
that certain communications with attorneys are being used to
facilitate violence or terrorist activity. 70 This standard is less
than the "probable cause" standard set out in the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.71 The purpose of
the "probable cause" standard is to protect the individual's
privacy interests. 72 Because the Bureau of Prisons regulation
uses the "reasonable suspicion" standard, it is highly questioned
and criticized as circumventing legislative authority and
interfering with the fundamental right of privacy. 73  The
69 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1242 (distinguishing difference between judge's
involvement in crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege, and Attorney General's
reasonable suspicion under Bureau of Prisons regulation). See generally Dobbins, supra
note 54, at 298 (claiming that monitoring regulation leaves inmates without any other
means of confidential communications with their lawyers); Enwright, supra note 67, at
1876 (stating that encroachment on attorney-client privilege is particularly intensified
when privilege team views privileged material of clients who are unrelated to
investigation).
70 See Mary Ellen Tsekos, Legislative Focus: Patriot Act, 9 HuM. RTS. BR. 35, 35
(2001) (stating that "Attorney General Ashcroft originally requested that law enforcement
officials be able to detain individuals indefinitely without formal charges"); see also Cover,
supra note 7, at 1235 (2002) (establishing that new rule authorizes Attorney General to
order monitoring or reviewing of communications between inmates and lawyers). See
generally Gauthier, supra note 32, at 352 (stating that new regulation allows U.S.
Attorney General to monitor attorney-client communications of suspected terrorist
prisoners).
71 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (setting forth probable cause standard for searches and
seizures); Cover, supra note 7, at 1235 (establishing that Attorney General may issue
order when federal law enforcement agencies have "reasonable suspicion to believe that a
particular inmate may use attorney-client communications to facilitate acts of terrorism");
see also Gauthier, supra note 32, at 352 (stating that new regulation allows attorney
general to monitor attorney-client communications of suspected terrorist prisoners "when
he has reasonable suspicion that an inmate may use communications with an attorney to
facilitate terrorist acts").
72 See National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Comments of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers on the Attorney General's Order Regarding
Monitoring of Confidential Attorney-Client Communications [66 Fed. Reg. 55062 (Oct. 31,
2001)] (2001) [hereinafter Comments] (stating that purpose of probable cause is to protect
individual's right of privacy) available at http://www.cnss.org/nacdlattorney
clientcomments.htm. See generally Charles G. Burgess, Recent Decisions: Ex Parte
Scarbrough, 46 ALA. L. REV. 211, 218 (1994) (stating that most lower courts appear to be
"torn between either an objective standard, a subjective standard, a modified objective or
reasonable officer standard, or a probable cause standard"); Erin Gallagher, Note, Board
of Education of Independent School District No. 92 v. Earls - Disintegration of Fourth
Amendment Rights: When the Government Finds Reasons to Take Them, 4 LOY. J. PUB.
INT. L. 59, 64 (2003) (stating that "warrantless search was justified by the public interest
in controlling the flow of illegal aliens and resulted only if the state officer had probable
cause to suspect illegal activity").
73 See Jennifer Pelic, Supreme Court Review, United States v. Arvizu: Investigatory
Stops and the Fourth Amendment: United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002), 93 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1033, 1034 (2003) (stating that in certain circumstances,
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''reasonable suspicion" standard usually only applies to those
situations where there is an imminent threat of harm to a
civilian or officer, as in "stop and frisk" situations. 74 However,
critics differentiate the intrusion on an inmate's conversations
with their attorney from the "on the spot" action, which requires
the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion.75 As a result, this
regulation is viewed as a vehicle that could lead to a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, stemming from its reasonable suspicion
standard.76
Third, the regulation was passed swiftly, as was the USA
Patriot Act, and in the eyes of civil libertarians, this created a
dangerous opportunity for the Department of Justice to use its
powers destructively. 77 The regulation was enacted unilaterally
individual suspicion and probable cause are replaced with reasonable suspicion due to
necessity for "swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on
the beat"); see also Cover, supra note 7, at 1235 (2002) (establishing that Attorney General
may issue order when federal law enforcement agencies have "reasonable suspicion to
believe that a particular inmate may use attorney-client communications to facilitate acts
of terrorism"); Gauthier, supra note 32, at 352 (stating that new regulation allows
attorney general to monitor attorney-client communications of suspected terrorist
prisoners "when he has reasonable suspicion that an inmate may use communications
with an attorney to facilitate terrorist acts").
74 See Pelic, supra note 73, at 1034 (stating that individual suspicion and probable
cause are replaced with reasonable suspicion). See generally Gauthier, supra note 32, at
352 (stating when new regulation allows for monitoring of attorney-client communications
of suspects); Gabriel M. Helmer, Note, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for
Reasonable Suspicion, 81 B.U. L. REV. 239, 288 (2001) (stating that iron curtain between
"prison and the Constitution may have been drawn aside, but the danger from legal
doctrines such as 'wide ranging deference' continues to threaten the borders of
constitutional liberties").
75 See Luke R. Spellmeier, Comment, Bypassing the Fourth Amendment: The
Missouri Supreme Court's Use of "Ruse" Reasonable Suspicion to Justify De Facto Drug
Interdiction Checkpoints State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706 (Mo. 2002), 42 WASHBURN L.J. 209,
216 (2002) (stating that lesser intrusion of brief and limited seizure for investigatory
purposes could be justified by something less than probable cause). See generally Cover,
supra note 7, at 1235 (establishing that federal enforcement agencies have reasonable
suspicion to believe that inmate can use attorney-client communications to facilitate
terrorism); Helmer, supra note 74, at 288 (stating that protection of the Constitution
applies to detainees).
76 See Comments, supra note 72 (recognizing dangerous effects of this regulation on
right to privacy) available at http://www.cnss.org/nacdlattorneyclientcomments.htm. See
generally Burgess, supra note 72, at 218 (stating that most lower courts "are torn as to
what standard to apply"); Gallagher, supra note 72, at 64 (stating "how probable cause is
necessary factor to justify warrantless searches').
77 See generally Downs & Kinnunen, supra note 10, at 388 (stating that another
problem with "USA PATRIOT Act is that it expands the definition of 'domestic terrorism'
so broadly that it could be applied to many activities that have no relation to the terrorist
attacks of September 11"); Smith, supra note 8, at 413 (emphasizing Patriot Act was
enacted quickly to promote national security); Tsekos, supra note 70, at 35 (stating that
"before passage of the Patriot Act, law enforcement officials seeking to obtain an order to
electronically monitor a suspected terrorist overseas had to demonstrate that the
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by the Attorney General without the usual protections of notice
and public comment afforded by the Federal Administrative
Procedures Act.78 It was posted in the Federal Register on
October 31, 2001, only one day after it went into effect. 79
Fourth, civil libertarians are also wary of the definition of
"domestic terrorism" set out in the Section 802 of the USA
Patriot Act as well as the definition of "acts of violence" set out in
the regulation.80 In order for the Attorney General to determine
whether or not to listen to the communications between an
attorney and a client, he must first determine whether or not he
has suspected that inmate of being involved in terrorism or acts
of violence.8 1 Prior to this new definition of terrorism, there were
three other defined types of terrorism already set forth in federal
collection of foreign intelligence information was the 'sole or primary purpose' of the
investigation").
78 See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 56, at 1116 (setting out the enactment of
regulation). See generally Downs & Kinnunen, supra note 10, at 388 (stating that under
previous approaches, government "limited the scope and definition of terrorism to a short
list of groups designated by the Secretary of State"); Tsekos, supra note 70, at 35 (stating
that "Patriot Act allows law enforcement officials to track e-mail communications in the
same way they monitor telephone conversations").
79 See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 56, at 1116 (claiming regulation extends to all
incarcerated individuals); see also Marie A. Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post-
September 11: Safeguarding the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern-American and Immigrant
Communities, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 63, 63 (2002) (stating that Congress acted quickly to
enact Patriot Act); Vijay Sekhon, Note, The Civil Rights of "Others'" Antiterrorism, The
Patriot Act, and Arab and South Asian American Rights in a Post-9/11 American Society,
8 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 130 (2003) (stating that Patriot Act was posted in Federal
Register on October 31, 2001).
80 See Charles I. Lugosi, Rule of Law or Rule by Law, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 225, 273
(2003) (stating that §802 of USA Patriot Act defines domestic terrorism, "to include
domestic political groups or individuals that engage or promote criminal acts that are
dangerous to human life, that appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population, by violence to bring about a change in government policy"); see also Emanuel
Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States: The
Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 6 (2002) (arguing that
section 802 of Patriot Act fails to meet essential condition of democratic regime); Quinn H.
Vandenberg, Note, How Can the United States Rectify its Post-9/11 Stance on Noncitizens'
Rights?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 605, 622-23 (2004) (affirming that
Patriot Act's broad definition of "domestic terrorism" raised questions as to what activity
could be considered pertinent criminal activity that Act was enacted to arrest).
81 See Gross, supra note 80, at 13 (stating that Attorney General has discretion to
determine whether detainee will use connection with his attorney to facilitate commission
of future terrorist acts); Tom D. Snyder, Jr., A Requiem for Client Confidentiality?: An
Examination of Recent Foreign and Domestic Events and Their Impact on the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 50 Loy. L. REV. 439, 446 (2004) (noting that Attorney General may
impose "Special Administrative Measures" such as eavesdropping when Attorney General
finds that "there is a substantial risk that a prisoner's communications or contacts with
persons could result in death or serious bodily injury."); Sekhon, supra note 79, at 128
(stating that section 412 of Patriot Act enables Attorney General to take into custody "any
foreign national whom he has "reasonable grounds to believe" is "engaged in any activity
that endangers the national security of the United States").
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law: international terrorism, terrorism transcending national
borders, and federal terrorism. 82 Now, a person can also be
charged with domestic terrorism if:
[W]ithin the U.S. they engage in activity that involves acts
dangerous to human life that violate the laws of the United
States or any State and appear to be intended: (i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination or kidnapping.8 3
Civil libertarians claim that this new definition is unnecessary
and it will subject everyday protestors to prosecution for
terrorism.8 4 The General Accounting Office released a study in
January 2003 that concluded that seventy-five percent of those
convicted under the Patriot Act of "international terrorism" after
September 11th, 2001, were actually dealing in more common
non-terrorist crimes.85
82 See How the USA-Patriot Act Would Convert Dissent into Broadly Defined
"Terrorism", ACLU Archives (Oct. 23, 2001) (stating September 11 attacks violated all
three of these types of terrorisms) at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/l102301d.html; see
also Decision of Interest; United States District Court, Southern New York; Alleged Al
Qaeda Operative's Stabbing of Prison Guard Is Not Terrorism; No Life Sentence; Judge
Batts, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2, 2003, at 20 (positing that Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act was Congress' way of expressing its legislative intent for "terrorism" to apply
to not only international terrorism, but also, to terrorism transcending national
boundaries). See generally Nancy Chang, How Does USA Patriot Act Affect Bill of Rights?,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 6, 2001, at 1 (stating that under section 215 of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, FBI may seek court order to produce tangible evidence sought
for investigation to protect against international terrorism).
83 See How the USA-Patriot Act Would Convert Dissent into Broadly Defined
'Terrorism" ACLU Archives (Oct. 23, 2001) (arguing this as overbroad definition of
terrorism) at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/1102301d.html; see also Barbara Dority,
Your Every Move, HUMANIST, Jan. 2004, at 14 (explaining "domestic terrorism" as
including those involved in aggressive protesting).
84 See How the USA-Patriot Act Would Convert Dissent into Broadly Defined
'Terrorism" ACLU Archives (Oct. 23, 2001) (claiming those protestors of organizations
such as World Trade Center organization could be arrested for terrorism under this
definition) at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/1102301d.html; see also Jerry Crimmins,
Judges Criticize Patriot Act, Effects on Rights, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 15, 2003, at 1
(noting that "domestic terrorism" is too broadly defined so that even 'Martin Luther King
could have been charged with domestic terrorism"); R. Robin McDonald, Patriot Act: Are
Abuses Real?, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 19, 2003, at 1 (stating that Act "lowers
the standards of judicial review, increases secrecy and reduces accountability ... ").
85 See Dority, supra note 83, at 14 (arguing Patriot Act may not be as effective as
Ashcroft claims it to be); see also Crimmins, supra note 84 (arguing that "power" under
Patriot Act "may soon be used against" U.S. Citizens); John G. Malcolm, USA Patriot Act
Opposition More Heat than Light, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 19, 2003, at 1
(quoting Senator Dianne Feinstein saying: "I have never had a single verified abuse of the
Patriot Act reported to me").
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Critics also question the broad definition of "acts of violence,"
leading them to the conclusion that all federal prisoners will be
subject to this regulation.8 6 They claim that the expansive terms
of "terrorism" and "acts of violence" will only increase the number
of federal inmates to these constrictive regulations.8 7
Furthermore, if the Attorney General uses these definitions of
"terrorism" and "acts of violence" to utilize the Bureau of Prisons
regulation, he will be able to listen in on conversations of those
inmates and their attorneys who were simply guilty of a state
crime, such as providing lodging to a protestor.88 In such a
circumstance, the regulation would reach far beyond its scope,
covering regular state criminal investigations.8 9
The American Bar Association and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers also agree that the monitoring of
attorney-client communication as set out in Ashcroft's regulation
violates the privilege, and that it is a serious infringement on the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.90 The Sixth Amendment
86 See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 56, at 1116 (communicating on danger of
having such broad definition). See generally Siobhan Roth, Anti-Terror Laws Increasingly
Used Against Ordinary Criminals, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 11, 2003 at 4 (explaining
Justice Department's use of the USA Patriot Act on ordinary criminals such as currency
smugglers and bookies); Mark Sommer, Civil Liberties 'Group's Resolution Urges The City
To Reject USA Patriot Act, BUFF. NEWS FINAL EDITION, at B2 (indicating many citizens
are not aware of loose interpretation of terrorism and that it has been applied to public
protests, regular criminal investigations and other such activities).
87 See Taylor Jr., supra note 67, at 60 (quoting Senator Dianne Feinstein stating "I
have never had a single abuse of the Patriot Act reported to me."); Whitehead & Aden,
supra note 56, at 1116 (stating expanding definition will include large number of federal
prisoners); see also Patricia Manson, Terrorism/Rights Nexus Will Spark Debates, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 5, 2004, at 1 (noting that current provisions in Patriot Act enable
delay in disclosing execution of "sneak and peek" warrant).
88 See Vanessa Blum, Towns Speak Out on Patriot Act But What are They Saying?,
RECORDER, Aug. 10, 2004, at 3 (stating that Patriot Act authorizes some activities that
are explicitly banned under state law enforcement); Jerry Crimmins, Amid War on Terror,
Law and Liberty Under Sharp Scrutiny, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 26, 2003, at 1 (stating
that federal government's power is growing); see also Whitehead & Aden, supra note 56,
at 1116 (explaining new crime of "harboring a terrorist.").
89 See How the USA-Patriot Act Would Convert Dissent into Broadly Defined
"Terrorism", ACLU Archives (Oct. 23, 2001) (opposing new definition of terrorism because
it allows federal government to regulate violations of state law) at
http://archive.aclu.org/congress/l102301d.html; Crimmins, supra note 88 (noting that
federal government is becoming more powerful); see also Martin, supra note 5, at 295
(noting that USA Patriot Act allows Federal government to conduct searches that are
illegal under state law).
90 See Whithead & Aden, supra note 56, at 1116 (showing this regulation jeopardizes
ability to seek effective representation); see also Thomas Adcock, Two Projects: One
Documents, One Practices 9/11 Pro Bono, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11, 2002, at 4 (stating that
Patriot Act enables warrantless monitoring of attorney-client conversations); John Caher,
A Summit on the Patriot Act Asks: Has it Gone too Far?, RECORDER, Jan. 30, 2004, at 3
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states, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."91 The
amendment recognizes the rights of the accused to speak
confidentially with a lawyer.92 Under the confines of the new
regulation, an accused will have a profound fear of being
overheard, and he will be inhibited to speak freely with his
attorney.93 This is coupled with the fact that many of the
detainees must already deal with the language barrier between
themselves and their attorney.94 It is also likely that they know
little about the American legal system, including the role that
their lawyer plays in the system. The American Bar Association
ant the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers have
commented on the chilling effect the regulation will have on
attorney-client communications. 95  They argue that the
repercussions of the regulation will seriously restrict the
effectiveness of counsel, thereby violating the Sixth Amendment
of the Constitution.96
(criticizing Patriot Act as it enables every part of conversation between attorney and
client to be monitored).
91 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
92 See id. (speaking of right to counsel); see also Snyder, Jr., supra note 81, at 442
(noting that confidentiality lies in heart of both attorney client privilege and Sixth
Amendment).
93 See Cover, supra note 7, at 1238 (noting that Bureau of Prisons Rule hinders
communication between attorney and his client). See generally Frank Kearns, Attorney-
Client Privilege for Suspected Terrorists: Impact of the New Federal Regulation on
Suspected Terrorists in Federal Custody, 27 NOVA L. REV. 475, 496 (2003) (acknowledging
that inmate's knowledge of being monitored will prevent him from speaking freely);
Snyder, Jr., supra note 81, at 454 (concluding that new rule will cause inmates to
withhold information from their attorneys).
94 See Flo Messier, Note, Alien Defendants In Criminal Proceedings: Justice Shrugs,
36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1405 (1999) (noting that language barrier is one of hardest
challenges facing alien defendants and their attorneys); see also Deborah M. Weissman,
Between Principles And Practice: The Need For Certified Court Interpreters In North
Carolina, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1899, 1905-06 (2000) (presenting problems that non English
speaking individuals face in utilizing their legal rights and effectively representing
themselves in court). See generally The D.C. Circuit Review August 1998 - July
1999; Recent Decisions, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 643, 649-51 (2000) (acknowledging that
non English speaking inmates are often denied fair hearing and appropriate medical
treatment).
95 See Comments, supra note 72 (expressing their fears that new rule will hinder
attorney client communication) available at http://www.cnss.org/nacdlattorneyclient
comments.htm; see also ABA Comm. On BOP-1116, AG Order No. 2529-2001 (2001)
(presenting the ABA's concerns regarding Attorney General's Order) available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/exec/attorneyclientl22801.html. See generally
Podgor & Hall, supra note 64, at 148 (describing ABA's and NACDL's response to
Attorney General's Order).
96 See Comments, supra note 72 (noting that new rule will hinder attorney client
communication); see also ABA Comm. On BOP-1116, AG Order No. 2529-2001 (2001)
(presenting ABA's belief that Bureau of Prisons Rule will adversely affect communication
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Most importantly, civil libertarians assert that the USA
Patriot Act and the Bureau of Prisons regulation have infringed
upon privacy, one of the most valued rights Americans enjoy. 97
Because of this infringement, three states and two hundred cities
have passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act.98 Civil
libertarians regard the Patriot Act and the Bureau of Prisons
regulation as products of fear, and as such, have become the
enemy of freedom. 99 The Patriot Act is regarded as a metaphor
for many violations of constitutional rights.100 Overall, civil
libertarians view this change to the attorney-client privilege as
against the purpose in promoting full and frank communications
between attorney and client.101
between inmates and their attorneys) available at http://www.abanet.org/poladvtletters/
exec/attorneyclientl22801.html. See generally Podgor & Hall, supra note 64, at 148
(presenting ABA's and NACDL's fears regarding Bureau of Prisons Rule).
97 See Marc Rotenberg, Modern Studies In Privacy Law: Forward: Privacy and
Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1126 (2002) (asserting right of
privacy, and limiting governmental secrecy as part of American tradition, as substantially
at risk after September 11, 2001); see also. Cunningham & Srader, supra note 9, at 315
(noting strong criticism of regulation by prominent leaders, lawyers and civil
libertarians). See generally Teri Dobbins, supra note 54, at 303-04 (2004) (presenting
strong disapproval of civil libertarians for new rule).
98 See Dority, supra note 83, at 14 (clarifying pockets of resistance toward giving up
civil liberties under Patriot Act are starting to appear around country); see, e.g., Briefing,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 17, 2004, at A45 (stating that town of Huntington passed
resolution opposing Patriot Act); Emily Szeszycki, Patriot Act Still Attracts Flak; 2 Iowa
Cities Have Formally Opposed the Legislation, but Dubuque is Not Likely to Do So,
TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, IA), Aug. 16, 2004, at Al (noting that two Iowa cities have
passed resolutions opposing Patriot Act).
99 See Cunningham & Srader, supra note 9, at 353-54 (noting that fear of terrorist
attacks has lead to constraint on constitutional rights of public); see also Whithead &
Aden, supra note 56, at 1116 (arguing that since 9/11, Americans' liberties have been
limited). See generally Steven Shapiro, supra note 53 at 1091 (promulgating in times of
crisis government often takes away liberties of American people)....
100 See Judy Bachrach, John Ashcroft's Patriot Games, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 2004, at
106 (quoting Laura W. Murphy, ACLU's chief lobbyist); see also Rebecca A. Copeland, War
On Terrorism Or War On Constitutional Rights? Blurring the Lines Of Intelligence
Gathering In Post-September 11 America, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (asserting that
Patriot Act has led to slow erosion of constitutional liberties); Whitehead & Aden, supra
note 56, at 1116 (arguing that although Patriot Act was not intended to limit liberties of
Americans, it consequently lead to violation of some constitutional rights).
101 See Cunningham & Srader, supra note 9, at 315 (noting that civil libertarians
oppose regulation and view it as limiting attorney client privilege); see also Snyder, Jr.,
supra note 81, at 442 (stating that "unfettered confidential communication" is core of
attorney client privilege). See generally Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981) (setting out purpose of the privilege).
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V. UNITED STATES V. SATTAR10 2 - A PRESENT DAY APPLICATION OF
THE AMENDMENT TO THE BUREAU OF PRISONS REGULATION
Lynne Stewart, a New York criminal defense attorney, was
indicted on April 8, 2002, for conspiracy to provide and for
providing material support to a terrorist organization, the
Islamic Group, for conspiracy to defraud the United States, and
for making false statements to the U.S. Department of Justice. 103
By opinion and order dated July 22, 2003, the counts of
conspiring to provide material support and resources to a
designated terrorist organization were dropped.104 However, the
crimes of conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of
18 U.S.C. §373 and making false statements in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 2 still remain.105
Stewart's indictment was a result of her representation of
Sheik Abdel Rahman, an inmate who is serving a life plus sixty-
five year sentence for soliciting crimes of violence against the
U.S. military and conspiring to bomb several New York City
landmarks. 106 Because of Rahman's dangerous propensities, he
was subject to special administrative procedures ("SAMs"), which
regulated his access to the mail, media, telephone, and
visitors.107 He was under this heavy surveillance to protect
persons against the risk of death or serious bodily injury. 0 8
102 No. 02 Cr. 395, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003).
103 See United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGOK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003 (stating same).
104 See id. at *2. (discussing dropped count).
105 See id. (announcing which charges Stewart still faces).
106 See United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that
Stewart has represented Sheikh Abdel Rahman since his 1995 criminal trial), motion
ruled upon by 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003);
see also Cohn, supra note 6, at 1249 (explaining that Rahman used his attorney-client
communications with Stewart to facilitate terrorist activity from jail); Peter Margulies,
The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of
Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173, 174 (2003) (discussing Stewart's indictment that
resulted from her representation of Rahman).
107 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1249 (asserting that regulation of Rahman was
necessary due to his earlier attempts to contact third parties in connection with
terrorism).
108 See Rules and Regulations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. §§
500, 501.3(a) (2002) (establishing that "[u]pon the direction of the Attorney General, the
Director, Bureau of Prisons may authorize the Warden to implement special
administrative measures that are reasonably necessary to protect persons against the
risk of death or serious bodily injury"); see also Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (declaring
that SAMs are enacted to protect 'persons against the risk of death or serious bodily
injury"); Cohn, supra note 6, at 1249 (stating that Rahman was subject to restrictions to
protect "persons against the risk of death or serious bodily injury").
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Stewart had to agree that she would abide by the SAMs when
representing Rahman.109 Therefore, she could only communicate
with him in regards to legal matters and was not allowed to use
her visit to help Rahman communicate to outside third parties. 110
Stewart allegedly used her communications with her client
Rahman to pass messages to third parties and allowed an
interpreter, Mohammad Yousy, to read letters to her client
regarding the terrorist organization's compliance with a cease-
fire in Egypt.1 1 Further, Stewart was charged with taking
affirmative steps to hide these discussions from prison guards
and for her announcement to the media of Rahman's intention to
withdraw his support in the cease-fire.112 Since Stewart had
communicated information to third parties, she was in clear
violation of the SAMs, resulting in a possible sentence of up to 40
years in prison.11 3
The Department of Justice had collected several attorney-client
communications between Rahman and Stewart including
notebooks, tape recordings of phone conversations, and
videotapes of prison visits. 114 This was the first attempt by the
Attorney General to use the amendment to the Bureau of Prisons
regulation enacted in October 2001.115 Stewart claimed that this
109 See Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (specifying that Rahman's counsel was
required to sign affirmation before gaining access to him); see also Cohn, supra note 6, at
1249 (affirming that before Stewart was allowed to speak with Rahman, she was required
to sign affirmation); Margulies, supra note 106, at 196 n.114 (highlighting that Stewart
admits to signing affirmation).
110 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1249 (articulating certain restrictions placed on
Stewart's communication with Rahman).
111 See id. at 1249-50 (violating her agreement to comply with SAMs).
112 See Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (revealing which allegations
remain against Stewart); see also Cohn, supra note 6, at 1249 (describing what Stewart
was charged with).
113 See Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (emphasizing that these communications are
in clear violation of SAMs); see also Cohn, supra note 6, at 1249 (clarifying that if Stewart
was convicted, she would face up to 40 years in prison).
114 See United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164,
at * 4-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003) (announcing how these attorney-client communications
were used against Stewart).
115 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1249 (proclaiming that these types of communications
had never been monitored before); see also Steve Fainaru, Saudi Convicted in Embassy
Bombings Sues; Filing Challenges Rule Allowing Eavesdropping on Attorney-Client
Discussions, WASH. POST, May 9, 2002, at A20 (commenting on Attorney General John
Ashcroft's announcement that this regulation would be applied to communications
between Rahman and Stewart); Robert F. Worth, Government Cuts Contact with Sheik,
Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 2002, at B4 (mentioning Attorney General John
Ashcroft's statement that Rahman will be first inmate to whom this regulation is
applied).
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monitoring infringed on her Fourth Amendment right to
communicate with her client, and that Ashcroft's procedures
froze attorney-client communications.11 6 Her main concern was
that in allowing the Department of Justice to monitor these
attorney-client communications, clients would begin to fear such
communication and in turn, be prevented the full and frank
communications between attorney and client.117 Stewart filed a
motion to compel disclosure of the notebooks and recordings that
were in the government's possession.1' 8 However, the United
States District Judge Koeltl denied her motions.11 9 The court
found no authority to support Stewart's notion that the fear of
being monitored had a substantial effect on the attorney-client
communications.1 20 Therefore, there was not enough evidence to
require the government to disclose whether or not they were
under court authority to conduct surveillances of certain
attorney-client communications. 21 Stewart's claim that the
surveillance of the communications was a violation of the Sixth
Amendment was also denied because the surveillance followed
proper court procedures. 12 2
Stewart then filed motions to suppress the videotapes of prison
visits and audiotapes recorded pursuant to FISA, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by the USA
Patriot Act, on the ground that the invasion into those
116 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164, at *4 (discussing Stewart's motion to
suppress certain attorney-client communications).
117 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1251-52 (suggesting that monitoring attorney-client
communications would hinder effective legal representation); Cunningham & Srader,
supra note 9, at 325 (arguing that attorney-client conversation will be affected since,
"whether or not the conversation is actually overheard or recorded, the client will likely
believe that the conversation is being overheard or recorded"); see also Laura Mansnerus,
A Nation Challenged: News Analysis; Fine Line in Indictment: Defense vs. Complicity,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at A23 (reiterating Lynne Stewart's statement that
government observation of lawyer-client communications has "almost a freezing effect on
[a lawyer's] ability to defend the person").
118 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1252 (citing the denial of Stewart's first motions).
119 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164, at *70 (denying all defendant's motions
in their entirety).
120 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *71 (stating that this and her other
arguments are moot or without merit); Cohn, supra note 6, at 1251 (rejecting Stewart's
notion that fear of surveillance was enough to compel government to disclose if it was
conducting investigations).
121 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *17 (noting that ample evidence exists to
determine whether surveillance was lawful without such disclosure).
122 See id. at *67 (stating that surveillance was obtained through valid search
warrant).
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communications violated the Fourth Amendment.123 She also
requested certain information be turned over to the court because
the information was allegedly attorney-client privileged
material.124 Justice Koeltl once again denied Stewart's
motions. 125 Her attempt to assert the attorney-client privilege to
protect the communications with her client was also denied
because she was trying to invoke the privilege to protect herself,
not her client. 126 Consequently, the court concluded she could not
assert the attorney-client privilege on her own behalf.127 The
privilege is only invoked when it is necessary to protect the
client, circumstances which were not necessary in this
instance. 128 Stewart was attempting, as a third party, to invoke
the attorney-client privilege for her own benefit because the
information was being used against her. However, the court
found "the privilege is not hers to invoke."129
Not only was Stewart's motion denied, but she also failed to
provide proof that the notebooks and prison recordings were
privileged before they were taken and recorded by the
government.130 She only made "blanket assertions" to establish
her burden that they met the essential elements of the
privilege. 131 The surveillance of the attorney-client
communications was lawfully executed.132 The government had
also given the appropriate notice to Stewart in the first
123 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *46 (arguing that because Stewart had
reasonable expectation of privacy in her meetings with her client, government's
surveillance violated her Fourth Amendment rights).
124 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 at *4 (discussing Stewart's motion to
suppress videotapes of visits to her clients and audio tapes of phone calls).
125 See id. at *70-71 (holding "the defendants' motions to suppress the fruits of the
FISA evidence are denied.").
126 See id. at *58 (explaining client holds privilege and is only person who can assert
it).
127 See id. (stating that Stewart has no standing to invoke privilege).
128 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 at *54 (noting privilege only applies
when necessary to achieve its purpose); see also In re Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d
Cir. 1997) (arguing that attorney-client privilege applies only where necessary to assist
client). See generally Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981) (stating
that privilege exists to further client's interests).'
129 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *58 (emphasizing that privilege belongs to
client).
130 See id. at *62 (reiterating that work product is only privileged if prepared to
assist in anticipated or current litigation).
131 See id. at *63 (stating that defendant has provided no affirmative evidence that
materials are privileged).
132 See id at *67 (stating that recordings were properly authorized by FISA and
notebooks were obtained by valid warrant).
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indictment that it had overheard certain communications, one of
which involved Stewart in May of 2000.133
As a result of Stewart's indictment, she began lobbying at
conferences against government procedures in situations such as
hers.134 She claimed that the procedures utilized under the USA
Patriot Act and the Bureau of Prisons regulations inhibit the full
and frank communications between attorney and client, and
thus, stop effective legal representation of criminal defendants,
especially those detainees after September 11, 2001.135 However,
as Justice Koeltl noted, there is no empirical evidence to support
Stewart's viewpoint.136 If there was, Stewart could have supplied
it in support of her motions to suppress the attorney-client
communication evidence.137
The case against Lynne Stewart demonstrates that the
attorney-client privilege is still intact after the enactment of the
USA Patriot Act and the amendment to the Bureau of Prisons
regulation. The core values protected by the attorney-client
privilege still stand.
First, the attorney-client privilege as "the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications known to the common
law,"138 has always been interpreted narrowly, and therefore is
133 See id. at *68 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003) (noting that Stewart's former counsel
admitted to knowing that government had transcripts of conversations).
134 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1253 (noting how Stewart has spoken at National
Lawyers Guild, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and California Public
Defenders Association since her indictment); see also Snyder, Jr., supra note 81, at 449
(discussing possibility that many lawyers will face same charges as Stewart). See
generally Deborah L. Rhode, Terrorists and Their Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at
A27 (stating "such felony indictments could affect lawyers' willingness to defend despised
groups).
135 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1252-53 (enumerating Stewart's arguments in favor of
protecting attorney's right to defend and preventing unnecessary governmental intrusion
in relationship between attorney and client); see also Elijah, supra note 64, at 135
(discussing Stewart's advocacy of attorney-client privilege and her belief that "she is being
used as an example to deter others from representing more controversial figures and
causes"). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Liberties Post-September 11: A Time of
Danger, a Time of Opportunity, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 3, 7 (2004) (commenting on
Stewart's "courage and refusal to be cowed into her advocacy").
136 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 at *62 (noting Stewart did not meet her
burden of proving that challenged communication was privileged).
137 See id. at *62-63 (discussing court's willingness to assess whether attorney-client
privilege extends to specific portions of material and noting Stewart's failure to direct
court to such specific provisions).
138 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (describing history and
purpose of attorney-client privilege).
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only invoked when necessary. 139 Especially in times of war, when
threats of terrorism are imminent, the privilege must continue to
be narrowly construed to protect the truth seeking process of the
legal system.140 This will create the means to promote the safety
and security of the nation while facilitating the administration of
justice.
Second, the privilege continues only to be asserted by the client
because it exists for their protection, not for the attorney's
protection. 141 Lynne Stewart was justifiably prevented from
asserting the privilege to protect herself from criminal
prosecution.142 The privilege is put in place to promote full and
frank disclosure between the attorney and the client, so that the
client feels comfortable to tell his whole story to his attorney.143
The client uses the privilege as a guarantee to be candid, and in
139 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164, at *54 (explaining strong public policy
in favor of interpreting privilege narrowly); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
404 (1976) (reasoning that because attorney-client privilege has effect of withholding
relevant information from fact finder, it must apply only where necessary); United States
v. Goldberger & Dublin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasizing how
attorney-client privilege must not conflict with countervailing law or strong public policy
and must be "strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits underlying its
purpose").
140 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1244 (describing Ashcroft's view that narrow
construction of attorney-client privilege is necessary in light of national security risks and
terrorism); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Terra Nova Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 2d 493, 496
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasizing how attorney-client privilege is adverse to normally
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for determining truth). See
generally In re Grand Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. 332, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (summarizing
legal system's fundamental truth seeking process).
141 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 at *58 (specifying that attorney-client
privilege can be asserted only by client or someone on client's behalf); see also In re Von
Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) (defining privilege as "belong[ing] to the client").
See generally In re Sarrio S.A., 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that only
client and those acting on behalf of client have standing to invoke attorney-client
privilege).
142 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 at *58 (holding that Stewart lacks
standing to invoke attorney-client privilege because her client has not presented any
opposition to disclosure of challenged materials and has, likewise, not requested relief
Stewart seeks); see also Sarrio, 119 F.3d at 147 (finding that because client did not invoke
and waive his right to attorney-client privilege, his attorney had no right to insist on
court's observance of privilege). See generally State-Wide Capital Corp. v. Superior Bank
FSB, No. 98 Civ. 0817, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18552, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2000)
(declaring attorney-client privilege inapplicable when it is invoked in absence of client
intent).
143 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that goal of
attorney-client privilege is to encourage candid discussions and full disclosure between
attorneys and their clients); see also Von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 100 (acknowledging that
attorney-client privilege exists for purpose of fostering comprehensive and honest
communication between an attorney and his client). See generally Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403
(emphasizing that the attorney-client privilege is meant to create comfort level so that the
client may freely disclose information).
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return they receive the best legal advice possible.144 Notably,
Stewart was not asserting the privilege for these purposes.145 As
a result, the principles of the common law privilege prevented
her from using the privilege to her benefit.
The checks and balances of the judicial system ensure that the
privilege will be protected, even in instances where the Bureau of
Prisons regulation is used to monitor attorney and client
communications. 146 As seen in this instant case, the privilege
maintained its narrow construction.147 The privilege would still
only be invoked when necessary to promote full and frank
communications between attorney and client.148 Proper notice,
given to the prison inmate and the attorney of the possible
surveillance of certain communications, protects the client from
being surprised.149 As long as the communications are not being
144 See State-Wide Capital, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18552 at *4 (noting that attorney-
client privilege fosters securing and rendering of legal advice); see also Fisher, 425 U.S. at
403 (summarizing practical and beneficial effects of privilege in attorney-client
relationship). See generally Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (stating that
privilege "is founded upon the necessity... of the aid of persons having knowledge of the
law... which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure").
145 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 at *59-60 (emphasizing that, contrary to
common law requirements, Stewart is not attempting to invoke privilege on behalf of her
client, government is already in possession of information Stewart wishes to shield, and
Stewart has not specifically referenced which materials allegedly fall under attorney-
client privilege). See generally Von Bolow, 828 F.2d at 100 (examining how broadening
scope of this privilege would render it less certain, less workable, and more convoluted);
Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967) (stating general
rule that privilege may not be used solely to benefit attorney).
146 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 at *62 (stating common law
requirements for asserting attorney-client privilege in various circumstances and
acknowledging constitutional and procedural arguments in favor of privilege in face of
Bureau of Prisons Act); see also Podgor & Hall, supra note 64, at 147 (summarizing
internal procedural limitations on Bureau of Prisons regulation). See generally Gauthier,
supra note 32, at 372-75 (suggesting that Bureau of Prisons regulation poses less threats
to attorney-client privilege post-September 11th than do ABA rules and common place
federal processes).
147 See Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 at *64 (emphasizing that materials do
not fall under privilege because Stewart has put forth only "blanket assertions" in support
of her argument and has not provided court with sufficient proof in satisfaction of
common law elements).
148 See id. at *58 (noting that attorney-client privilege does not bar government from
turning over information that has already been obtained to co-defendant in cases); see
also United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (accepting notion that underlying
purpose of attorney-client privilege has changed, yet remains focused on promoting full
and frank communications between lawyer and client); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (noting
"purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients").
149 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1243 (stating that absent prior court authorization, the
Department of Justice is required to give notice to defendant and their lawyer prior to
conducting surveillance); R. Aubrey Davis III, Big Brother the Sneak or Big Brother the
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used to facilitate acts of violence or terrorism, the
communications will be kept privileged, and will not be used
against the client.15o
Other safeguards on the privilege, including the "privilege
team," provide more assurance that the communications, when
collected by the government, will not be misused.151 Presently,
there is no evidence to show that the Bureau of Prisons
regulations unfairly prevents the inmate from getting effective
legal representation or that it prevents the attorney from
rendering legal advice to the client.152 The judge also plays a role
in making sure the procedures under the USA Patriot Act and
the Bureau of Prisons regulations are properly followed.153 If the
procedures are not followed, the defendant's motions to exclude
the information will be upheld and the evidence will be
suppressed. 154
Sentry: Does a New Bureau of Prisons Regulation Truly Abrogate the Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 163, 168 (2004) (discussing consequences of Bureau of
Prisons regulation, including requirement of notice before instituting surveillance);
Dobbins, supra note 54, at 303 (noting that government may not covertly listen to
attorney client communications, but rather must inform attorney and inmate in writing
prior to initiation of monitoring).
150 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1243 (stating that privilege team is not to release
information obtained through surveillance of attorney client communications unless
authorized by judge or necessary to protect imminent violence or terrorism); Dobbins,
supra note 54, at 302 (noting that privilege team assists in assuring information obtained
through monitoring of communications is used solely to deter possible future violence or
terrorism). See generally Collins, supra note 59, at 14A (arguing no confidentiality is
violated by this regulation).
151 Dobbins, supra note 54, at 302-03 (discussing various protections required under
Bureau of Prisons regulations); Marianne Kerber & Alexis M. Thomas, Current
Development 2002-2003, The Erosion of Privacy After September 11: A Call to Arms for
the Protection of the Attorney-Client Relationship in the Face of a National Crisis, 16 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHIcS 693, 699 (2003) (noting requirements that Attorney General must meet
before using communications against prisoner); Podgor & Hall, supra note 64, at 147
(describing different restrictions on ability to use information obtained from monitoring
attorney client communications).
152 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1252 (stating Judge Koeltl rejected Stewart's
presumption that surveillance hindered attorney-client relationship). But see Kerber &
Thomas, supra note 151 at 702 (noting that regulation could have effect); Cunningham &
Srader, supra note 9, at 325 (discussing potentially serious affect that regulation may
have on attorney-client privilege).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16164, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003) (exemplifying court analysis of procedures used by
government to do surveillance on Stewart and client Rahman). But see Cohn, supra note
6, at 1242 (arguing that Bureau of Prison regulations does not provide for any judicial
oversight); Podgor & Hall, supra note 64, at 147 (noting communications will not be used
without court order unless it involves imminent terrorist or violent actions).
154 See generally Cohn, supra note 6, at 1242 (noting procedure for utilizing
communications intercepted under Bureau of Prisons regulation); Dobbins, supra note 54,
at 303 (noting uses of information obtained from scrutinizing attorney-client
communications); Kerber & Thomas, supra note 151 at 698-99 (discussing ways in which
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Stewart stated, "[u]sually if one breaks a Bureau of Prisons...
edict, one is told one can't visit the prison again, or one gets some
sort of administrative slap on the wrist of some kind. One does
not usually get indicted for aiding a terrorist organization."155
However, these are not usual times. After the threat of terrorism
became a reality on September 11, 2001, it became necessary to
invoke a larger punishment to deter attorney's who facilitate
communications with terrorist organizations. 156 In a time of war,
the balance of national security and civil liberties is tested. 157
Both the protection of these liberties, including privileges such as
the attorney-client privilege, can be upheld, while creating a
greater defense mechanism against terrorism. 158
VI. REBUTTAL TO CIVIL LIBERTARIANS CLAIMS THAT THE USA
PATRIOT ACT AND THE BUREAU OF PRISON REGULATIONS GO TOO
FAR.
The USA Patriot Act and Ashcroft's amendment to the Bureau
of Prisons regulations were enacted to combat the immediate
threat of terrorism. 159 Civil libertarians often forget to mention
the catalyst for enacting the amendments when they attack them
information obtained during monitoring of attorney-client communications can properly
be used).
155 See Cohn, supra note 6, at 1254 (mentioning Stewart's views on threat to
attorney-client communications).
156 See generally Dobbins, supra note 54, at 346 n.34 (giving purpose of rule allowing
monitoring of attorney client communications); Jennifer Evans, supra note 8, at 934
(proposing enacting of legislation such as Patriot Act was to facilitate terrorism
investigations and put end to terrorism); Snyder, Jr., supra note 81, at 447 (noting prompt
passage of USA Patriot Act in order to facilitate collection of information).
157 See Dowley, supra note 8, at 180 (discussing changing standard of reasonableness
in light of changing potential threats); Evans, supra note 8, at 990 (concluding there is
long history of balance between liberties and security); see also Taylor, supra note 79, at
64 (discussing need to re-evaluate balance of civil liberties in light of attacks of September
1 1th in order to prevent future terrorist attacks).
158 See Viet D. Dinh, Freedom and Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 399, 400 (2002) (arguing that liberty and security are not mutually exclusive
notions); Kerber & Thomas, supra note 151, at 700 (discussing government's attempts to
balance liberty and protection).
159 See Tsekos, supra note 70, at 35 (noting USA Patriot Act was enacted to eliminate
terrorist threats); Dana B. Weiss, Note, Protecting America First: Deporting Aliens
Associated with Designated Terrorist Organizations That Have Committed Terrorism in
America in the Face of Actual Threats to National Security, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 307, 313
(2002-2003) (stating that purpose of Patriot act was to deter and punish terrorism in
United States). See generally Charles A. Flint, Comment, Challenging the Legality of
Section 106 of the USA Patriot Act, 67 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (2004) (arguing that
primary goal of Patriot Act is to remove monetary resources of terrorist organizations).
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as being unconstitutional.160 It must be remembered that in
times of war and when there are increasingly heavy threats of
future terrorism, promoting national security is the most
important goal on the government's agenda.161 The Framers of
the Constitution supported the notion that in times of war and
threatened national security, the government had the power to
deal with those threats.162
The United States is presently in the largest and most intense
criminal investigation in the world. Effectively, the main
objective must be to expand and enhance terrorism legislation to
prevent any terrorist attack. 163 There are rational governmental
interests behind the restrictions on inmates' attorney-client
communications. 164 In order to fully accomplish these goals,
160 See Dority, supra note 83, at 14 (arguing USA Patriot Act and Attorney General
Ashcroft's procedures disseminate many civil liberties). But see Cohn, supra, note 6, at
1233 (noting that Attorney General Ashcroft responded to September 11th by
"attack[ing]" civil liberties); Kerber & Thomas, supra note 151, at 693 (discussing
September 1lth as the motivation for Patriot Act and Bureau of Prisons regulation).
161 See Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of
Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1274 (2004) (noting that "the Department of
Justice has made clear that its top priority is the prevention of terrorism"); see also
Ruchir Patel, Immigration Legislation Pursuant to Threats to US National Security, 32
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 83, 104 (2003) (recognizing that importance of protecting
citizens from terrorist threats will be emphasized as top priority in Congress' future
legislation). See generally Philip Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the
Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 441, 442 (2002) (listing three ways
to increase national security: prevention, consequence management, and punishment).
162 See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The 9/11 'National Security' Cases: Three Principles
Guiding Judges' Decision-Making, 81 OR. L. REV. 985, 994 (2002) (observing that "the U.S.
Supreme Court has strongly suggested that the executive enjoys a degree of
constitutionally-based discretion to act in matters of national security"); see also Dowley,
supra note 8, at 174 (noting Framers' intent to give authority to government to deal with
significant national security threats); Evans, supra note 8, at 947-48 (mentioning that in
certain needy times, government broadly interprets procedures necessary to protect
national security).
163 See Donald A. Dripps, Reflections on the Criminal Justice System after September
11, 2001: Terror and Tolerance: Criminal Justice for the New Age of Anxiety, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRiM. L. 9, 17 (2003) (stating that goal of anti-terror policy should be prevention rather
than retaliation); see also Heymann, supra note 161, at 442 (discussing need to learn of
terrorists' plans in advance in order to monitor their efforts and frustrate those efforts).
See generally Peter G. Madrinan, Devil in the Details: Constitutional Problems Inherent in
the Internet Surveillance Provisions of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, 64 U. PITT. L. REV.
783, 785-86 (2003) (explaining that "in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
Congress rewrote many provisions of the Federal Crimes Code-transforming some of the
electronic surveillance tools traditionally associated with criminal investigations into
statutory weapons useful in the new 'war on terrorism"').
164 See Margulies, supra note 106, at 208 (noting that Sheikh Abdel Rahman was
"appropriately subject to restrictions on contact and communication" in dealing with his
attorney); see also Dinh, supra note 158, at 399 (describing "prevailing wisdom" among
Americans as accepting that loss of certain freedoms is necessary for additional security).
But see Whitehead & Aden, supra note 56, at 1083 (opining that rights of government
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surveillance teams and law enforcement agencies need efficient
tools to combat these threats before they occur. It is not enough
to remedy terrorism after it occurs. 165 There is a reasonable
balance between national security and civil liberties when
utilizing the defense mechanisms set out in the USA Patriot Act
and the Bureau of Prisons regulations.166 Specifically, certain
conversations and communications between terrorists and their
attorneys, which serve as tools for terrorists to promote acts of
violence and terrorism, should be monitored as part of these
prevention procedures. 167
The civil libertarians first argue that the procedures used by
the Justice Department and the Attorney General are extra tools
that are not needed to combat terrorism and prevent imminent
acts of violence, thus creating the possibility that they will
misuse their authority.168 However, the USA Patriot Act and
subsequent legislation, such as the Bureau of Prisons regulation,
officials have been extended to "eavesdropping on attorney/client communications" under
"guise" of stopping terrorism).
165 See Heymann, supra note 161, at 442 (identifying prevention as most probable
way to stop terrorists); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Why they Hate Us: The Role of Social
Dynamics, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 429, 430 (2002) (stating that "especially effective
method" of stopping terrorism is to prevent terrorists from associating with one another
and planning attacks). See generally Adrienne R. Bellino, Notes & Comments, Changing
Immigration for Arabs with Anti-terrorism Legislation: September 11th Was Not the
Catalyst, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 123 (2002) (analyzing effectiveness of anti-
terror legislation in preventing attacks).
166 See Kelly R.. Cusick, Note, Thwarting Ideological Terrorism: Are We Brave
Enough to Maintain Civil Liberties in the Face of Terrorist Induced Trauma?, 35 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 55, 79 (2003) (recognizing that it is reasonable in certain situations to
sacrifice suspect's right to notice of search or seizure in favor of other concerns); Evans,
supra note 8, at 179 (agreeing that certain surveillance measures are "reasonable,
constitutional, and necessary for protection of American citizens"). See generally
Lawrence D. Sloan, Note, Echelon and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A
Need for Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1467, 1469 n.7 (2001) (noting that "the drafters of
our Constitution recognized the need to sacrifice personal freedom in the name of national
security").
167 See Rules and Regulations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. §§
500, 501 (2002) (stating that "a legitimate law enforcement interest" in monitoring
attorney-client conversations is "the prevention of acts of violence or terrorism."); see also
Collins, supra note 59, at 14A (explicating that monitoring of communications between
inmate and attorney prevents future terrorist incidents); Michael Powell, Accused of
Aiding Terror Plot, Lawyer Braces for Fight of Her Life, WASH. POST, June 22, 2004 at
A03 (describing conversations between layer and her client that were allegedly used in
furtherance of terrorist plot).
168 See Taylor, supra note 67, at 60 (identifying Patriot Act as tool that will be
improperly used on ordinary criminals). See generally Susan W. Brenner, Complicit
Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and Data be Criminalized?, 13 ALB.
L.J. Sci. & TECH. 273, 289 n.57 (2003) (recognizing perceived tendency among government
officials to misuse powers that they are given); Jeremy Travis, Note, Rethinking Sovereign
Immunity After Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 618 (1982) (stating that "courts have often
recognized that the nature of governmental power lends itself at times to misuse").
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have proven very effective and helpful to fight terrorism. 169 They
have increased the investigator's ability to deal with terrorism
activities, including weapons offenses, weapons of mass
destruction, and terrorism financing.170 This legislation has been
stated as necessary to enable law enforcement officials to
"effectively monitor and track the enemy before their horrific
plans come to fruition."171
Based on the statistics, it is evident that a more restrictive
agenda, exemplified in the USA Patriot Act and the procedures
followed by the Department of Justice, has been effective in
catching those targeted as dangerous suspects involved in
terrorism. 172 These procedures that increase national security
were necessary to identify and disrupt one-hundred and fifty
terrorist cells since September 11, 2001.173 Two-thirds of al-
Queda's known senior leadership has also been caught or killed,
169 See Patel, supra note 161, at 104 (suggesting that Patriot Act has been effective,
thus far, in improving immigration system and gathering intelligence leading to capture
of terrorist leaders). See generally Davis III, supra note 149, at 166-67 (summarizing
expected benefits of restricting attorney-client privilege under Bureau of Prisons
Regulations in stating that "the government, namely the Attorney General, has a firm
belief that monitoring such conversations will avert potential terrorist attacks").
170 See Dep't of Justice, USA Patriot Act Overview, (supporting use of Patriot Act
against terrorists) available at http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/patriot-overview_
pversion.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004); Patel supra note 161, at 97 (2003) (explaining that
Patriot Act led to creation of Border Security Act of 2002, which resulted in benefits on
Border Patrol, visa issuance, and foreign student and exchange programs).
171 See Dowley, supra note 8, at 183.
172 See Lisa Finnegan Abdolian & Harold Takooshian, The USA Patriot Act: Civil
Liberties, the Media, and Public Opinion, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1429, 1440 (2003)
(indicating that government has put Patriot Act to "excellent use" in discovering A1-Qaeda
cells in New York, Michigan, and Oregon); see also Bryan Bender, AG Touts Patriot Act;
Opponents Unconvinced, BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 2004 at Al (summarizing Attorney
General Ashcroft's discussion of report showing "how effective the Patriot Act has been:
helping uncover terrorist cells in upstate New York and Oregon; leading to the
indictments of individuals involved with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist group;
uncovering a case in Florida involving money laundering for a leftist terror group in
Colombia..."); Rita Katz & Josh Devon, The Weakness of the West, NAT'L REV. ONLINE,
Sept. 17, 2002, (praising the general success of the Patriot Act) at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-katz09l8O2.asp.
173 See Dep't of Justice, USA Patriot Act Overview, (supporting the Patriot Act and
its effects on terrorism) available at http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/patriot-overview_
pversion.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). See generally Lindsay N. Kendrick, Comment,
Alienable Rights and Unalienable Wrongs: Fighting the 'War on Terror' Through the
Fourth Amendment, 47 How. L.J. 989, 999 (2004) (recognizing that Patriot Act "allowed
for potential terrorist cells to be broken up, terrorist threats to be intercepted, senior
leadership of Al-Qaeda to be thwarted, and financial networks that sponsor terrorists to
be disassembled"); Elizabeth M. McCormick, Book Review Essay, Enemy Aliens: Double
Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L.
423, 423 (2004) (quoting President Bush as declaring that one purpose of Patriot Act is to
'disrupt' terrorist cells).
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including the masterminds responsible for participation in the
September 11, 2001 attacks.1 74 Other terrorist cells in major
cities across the United States have been destroyed, and in the
long-term, the Department of Justice is building a stronger
network against terrorism.1 75 Although it is too early to calculate
the efficiency of the amendment to Bureau of Prisons regulation,
it is the next logical step to prevent those captured from keeping
contact and involvement with their terrorist friends who have not
yet been caught.
The civil libertarians also dispute the lack of judicial standards
involved in the regulation, which allow the Attorney General to
make the sole decision on whether or not to monitor specific
attorney-client conversations.1 76 However, as examined in the
analysis of United States v. Sattar,177  above,' 78  sufficient
measures keep the processes implicated by the Attorney General
174 See Erik Schechter, Generic Jihad, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 5, 2003, at 14 (quoting
Paul Wolfowitz as stating that "two thirds of al-Qaida's identified leadership had been
either captured or killed"); Catherine Wild, Parents of a Soldier React, J. NEWS, Jan. 21,
2004, at 6A (quoting President Bush as stating that "the United States has captured or
killed two-thirds of the leadership of the al-Qaida network, although Osama bin Laden
remains at large"). See generally Mark Silva, Graham Decries Administration's 'Sorry
Record' In War On Terror, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 14, 2004, at K2373 (noting that
United States has killed two thirds of al-Qaida and toppled two dictatorships in war on
terror).
175 See, Tom Brune, Chilling Portrait Of Threat to U.S.; FBI, CIA Heads Detail
Terror Network, NEWSDAY (New York), Feb. 12, 2003, at A04 (quoting FBI Director Robert
Mueller as stating that "within the United States, ... at least six suspected terror cells
have been disrupted, nearly 200 people have been charged criminally and nearly 500
others deported"). But see Mark Matthews, Intelligence Chiefs Present Dark View of
Global Terror; Concerns Over Iraq Raised; Al-Qaida Is Still Capable of Attack, Tenet Tells
Senators, BALT. SUN, Feb. 25, 2004, at 1A (quoting FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III as
stating that "al-Qaida has retained a "cadre of supporters" within the United States to
develop plots and carry out instructions"). See generally Faye Bowers, Al-Qaida Two
Years Later; Arrests Leave Group Leaner, But Officials Remain Leaner, SEATTLE TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2003, at A3 (highlighting an FBI officials remarks to Congress that FBI knows
of domestic support cells and has "ongoing operations directed against suspected al-Qaida
members and their affiliates in about 40 states").
176 See, Cohn, supra note 6, at 1242 (highlighting complaint by ACLU that "new
regulation permits the Department of Justice unlimited and unreviewable discretion to
eavesdrop on confidential attorney-client conversations of persons in custody, with no
judicial oversight and no meaningful standards"); Dobbins, supra note 54, at 303-04
(highlighting that many prominent legal, law enforcement, human rights, civil liberty,
and religious scholars and organizations submitted comments arguing that Bureau of
Prisons Amendment violates inmates' Sixth Amendment right to counsel). See generally
Podgor & Hall, supra note 64, at 148 (noting that many groups, including National
Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys, New York State Association of Criminal
Defense Attorneys, and American Civil Liberties Union, are vehemently opposed to
Bureau of Prisons Amendment).
177 No. 02 Cr. 395, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003).
178 See infra Part V.
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in place. 179 Although the Attorney General oversees the initial
determination of whether or not to monitor certain
communications, the "privilege team" and a judge overseeing the
reasonability to the procedures will have the last word on
whether or not to keep certain information confidential.18 0 The
"privilege team" must still seek a court order to share the
information collected from these communications with the
prosecutors and other government agents involved.i18
Furthermore, civil libertarians urge citizens to believe that
these procedures are tactics used against all American citizens
convicted of ordinary crimes. However, in 2001, only sixteen out
of 158,000 individuals were even assigned to special
administrative status, making them available for monitoring.182
Additionally, these monitoring processes are similar to the
processes used to determine if there is a crime-fraud exception in
which a judge is given sole discretion to make the
determination. 8 3  Although the attorney general is given
179 See, e.g., Sattar, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS at *64 (holding legal advice between
attorney and client is still protected by attorney client privilege); see also Davis III, supra
note 149, at 166 (highlighting that "Bureau of Prisons regulation requires Director of
Federal Bureau of Prisons to "provide appropriate procedures for the monitoring or review
of communications between that inmate and attorneys or attorneys' agents"). But see
Whitehead & Aden, supra note 56, at 1116-17 (noting that prior government standard for
monitoring attorney-client conversation has eroded from one of "probable cause" that
criminal activity was occurring to standard of "reasonable suspicion").
180 See Rules and Regulations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. §
501.3(d) (2002) (stating, in relevant part that 'The Director, Bureau of Prisons, with the
approval of the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, shall employ
appropriate procedures to ensure that all attorney-client communications are reviewed for
privilege claims'); see also, Dobbins, supra note 54, at 303 (stating that "privilege team"
will be designated to "ensure that privileged material is not disclosed to the prosecution
team"); Dowley, supra note 8, at 181 (highlighting that judicial review allows courts to
limit abuses under Patriot Act).
181 See Shapiro, supra note 53, at 1091 (describing government's safeguards
protecting attorney-client privilege); see also Kearns, supra note 93, at 480 (stating that
once team decides information is not protected and should be disclosed it still needs court
order to release information"). But see Cunningham & Srader, supra note 9, at 315
(highlighting that "privilege team" may disclose information without court order when
team determines that acts of violence or terrorism are imminent).
182 See, Paul R. Rice & Benjamin Parlin Saul, Is the War on Terrorism A War On
Attorney-Client Privilege, 17 CRIM. JUST. 22, 23 (2002) (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft
as stating that "We have the authority to monitor the conversations of 16 of the 158,000
federal inmates and their attorneys because we suspect these communications are
facilitating acts of terrorism"). See generally Cohen, supra note 48, at 30 (identifying
Ashcroft's use of these special monitoring procedures directly after September 1lth).
183 See Collins, supra note 59, at 14A (positing that confidential communications are
not infringed upon any differently with amendment than with crime-fraud exception); see
also Podgor & Hall, supra note 64, at 163 (noting that crime-fraud exception to attorney-
client privilege already permits government to gather and use type of information sought
through Bureau of Prisons Amendment). But see Cohn, supra note 6, at 1239
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authority to determine what communications can be monitored,
the "privilege team" must still gain permission from an
independent judge to give the monitored communications to the
prosecution team.18 4 Effectively, there are sufficient safeguards
in place to mimic a detached magistrate overlooking the
procedure. The same type of procedure was used on former
President Clinton, to determine whether or not he was
corroborating in criminal activity.18 5
Even though the USA Patriot Act and the Bureau of Prisons
regulation were enacted in the month immediately following the
September 11th attack, it was not unreasonable or inconceivable
to rely on the national government to properly act in regards to
security as soon as possible. Americans expect that their
government, including Congress, react to the needs of the
American people. At that moment, the American people needed
protection from terrorist threats and invasions within their land.
Reflecting these needs, the USA Patriot Act was passed with
overwhelming bipartisan support. 186 At that time, it was also not
certain how imminent the acts of violence and terrorism were.18 7
(highlighting that in contrast to crime-fraud cases, where piercing attorney-client
privilege is reserved for courts determination, Bureau of Prisons Amendment leaves
determination to prosecutors or prison officials).
184 See Dobbins, supra note 54, at 303 (highlighting that "[ulnless the head of the
privilege team determines that acts of violence or terrorism are imminent, no information
gathered from monitoring may be disclosed to anyone without approval from a federal
judge'); see also Cohn, supra note 6, at 1242-43 ('The DOJ shall employ appropriate
procedures to ensure that all attorney-client communications are reviewed for privilege
claims and that any properly privileged materials... are not retained during the course
of the monitoring."). See generally Cole, supra note 10, at 549 (emphasizing that
Department of Justice finds that requirement for judicial approval safeguards attorney-
client privilege).
185 See Bachrach, supra note 100, at 106 (claiming that attorney-client privilege has
been intruded upon for less serious affairs); see also Naftali Bendavid, Appeals Court
Questions Ruling On Clinton's Release of Willey Letters, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 2000, at N16
(discussing appellate review of federal judges' determination that certain communications
between Bill Clinton and his attorney were outside attorney-client privilege due to crime-
fraud exception).
186 See Brian Bender, supra note 172, at Al (noting that Patriot Act was passed with
overwhelming bipartisan support following 2001 attacks); see also Mary Beth Buchanan,
Liberty and Security For All: The Balancing Act, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 21,
2003, at B1 (emphasizing that "Congress passed the Patriot Act, almost unanimously in
the Senate by a vote of 98-1, and overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives by a
vote of 357-66, with bipartisan support across the political spectrum").
187 See Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting
Burned by the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1657, 1705-06 (2003) (stating how Patriot Act was passed after terrorist attack
and that "American people do not have the luxury of unlimited time in erecting the
necessary defenses to future terrorist acts"). See generally Jonathan Grebinar, Note,
Responding to Terrorism: How Must a Democracy Do It? A Comparison of Israeli and
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Therefore, it was only proper that the government act as quickly
as they did.
The government further disputes the contention that the
definition of terrorism is too broad.188 The definition of "domestic
terrorism" in section 802 of the USA Patriot Act only applies to
those violations of state or federal law and those that are
dangerous to human life.iS9 Therefore, organizations who
peacefully protest the government views will not be targeted
under this provision. The argument that peaceful political
organizations will be attacked by the Justice Department is not
supported under this definition of terrorism.1 90
Finally, those opposing the USA Patriot Act and the regulation
amendment concerning the attorney-client privilege claim that
Constitutional guarantee of privacy' 91 is infringed.192 However,
American Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 261, 280 (2003) (noting "that Patriot Act was
drawn up and enacted under severe pressure to respond to the September llth
attack..."); Thomas Michael McDonnell, The Death Penalty-An Obstacle to the "War
against Terrorism'?, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 353, 355-06 (2004) (discussing how
Congress tried to meet demands for safety. in passing USA Patriot act).
188 See Dep't of Justice, USA Patriot Act Overview (describing how Patriot Act
provides appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism) available at
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/patriot-overview-pversion.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
But see Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse
Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 142 (2003) (noting fear that "any domestic crime
with an underlying political motive" may be equated to act of terrorism).
189 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, 107 P.L. 56, § 802
(2001) (defining "domestic terrorism as activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State..."); see also O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 187, at 1712 (describing Section 802
definition of domestic terrorism and who it applies to...").
190 See Dep't of Justice, USA Patriot Act Overview (disputing ACLU's contention that
USA Patriot Act will be used against peaceful protestors) available at
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/patriot.overviewpversion.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
But see Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot Act, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 450 (2002)
(noting broad definition of terrorism and its effect on those practicing civil disobedience);
Whitehead & Aden, supra note 56, at 1116 (concerning danger of such broad definition of
terrorism).
191 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 176 (1973) ("The Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however... the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)
(explaining that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, [which] create
zones of privacy"). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I, V and XIV (for basis of Supreme
Court decisions protecting right to privacy).
192 See Rotenberg, supra note 97, at 1126 (understanding roots of privacy in
American tradition); Whitehead & Aden, supra note 56, at 1115 (arguing that "[mlany of
the new regulations have undercut the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by inhibiting
both the ability to obtain counsel and the privacy that is afforded through the attorney-
client relationship."); Cover, supra note 7, at 1235 (noting criticisms of " government's
interception of attorney-client communications").
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the American people have not agreed with this argument.194
After September 11, 2001, eighty-two percent of Americans did
not feel that their civil liberties were infringed upon, and agreed
with the Bush administration's procedures to deal with terrorist
criminal detainees. 195 Polls taken in 2003, exhibited public
support again, noting that Americans still did not feel pressure
on their civil liberties. 196 The importance of this is grounded in
the fact that the government, including the Department of
Justice and Congress, is working for the American people. The
193 See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, "Migration Regulation Goes Local: The
Role of States in U.S. Immigration Policy": Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
295, 345 (2002) (noting that, in response to events of September 11, tactics of law
enforcement caused minorities to suffer "with little negative public reaction and general
public support for the U.S. government's response"); Robert S. Boyd, Americans Getting
Used to Tighter Security, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 26, 2002, at 9A (stating "polls
exhibit American support for expanded law enforcement powers due to fear of terrorism").
But see Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring The Imperial Presidency: An Examination Of
President Bush's New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMIINE J. PUB. L. & POL'y 455, 458-59
(2002) (commenting that reason public was generally satisfied with President Bush's
handling of terrorist situation through expansion of his own executive powers was
because the public had "not yet felt the sting of these new powers").
194 See Cohen, supra note 48, at 30 (stating "polls showing support for increased
government power"); see also Boyd, supra note 193, at 9A (discussing polls in favor of
expanded law enforcement). See generally Akram & Johnson, supra note 193, at 345
(showing general public support for government's response to September 11th attacks).
195 See Diana Bellettieri & Khurram Saeed, What it Means to be a Patriot, J. NEWS,
July 4, 2003, at 1A (noting "[plublic opinion polls show most Americans are solidly behind
the president and his administration's actions, whether it's invading Iraq or passing
legislation to curtail individual civil liberties in the name of security."); What Price
National Security?, CONN. LAW TRIB., Sept. 8, 2003, at 17 (stating although provisions of
Patriot Act are encroachments on civil liberties, polls indicate willingness to accept such
encroachments for security purposes); see also Josh Richman, Lockyer's Civil Liberties
Record is Key in Run for Governorship; California Voters Will Recall His Enforcement of
Homeland Security Come Election Time, Experts Say, OAKLAND TRIB., May 21, 2003 at
Headline News (commenting "Public opinion polls tend to show California is 'out of sync'
with the national willingness to sacrifice constitutional protections...").
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polls corroborate that the people are being represented properly
while retaining their privacy and freedoms.197
VII. CONCLUSION
The largest group of critics of the post 9/11 legislation directed
at terrorists, are those the believe the government had too much
power before the threats of terrorism made an appearance on
United States soil.198 However, those events, that are still in the
vivid memories of the American population, promoted the
initiative to take control of national security. 199 Prevention is the
key for stopping terrorism worldwide. Many high-ranking
officials of terrorist organizations are already behind bars
because of the successful use of the USA Patriot Act.200 The
communications of these dangerous and violent criminals must
now be monitored in certain instances to prevent them from
striking again.
196 See Malcolm, supra note 85, at 1(claiming Patriot Act does not "unduly infringe"
on civil liberties); Paul Rosenzweig, In Reality, the Widely Demonized Law Thwarts
Terrorists, Hasn't Been Abused; The Patriot Act; Who's Being Targeted?, BALT. SUN, July
23, 2004, at 19A (noting that official designated by Patriot Act to monitor use of Act and
report any abuse "has reported that there have been no instances in which the Patriot Act
has been invoked to infringe on civil rights or civil liberties"). But see What Price National
Security?, supra note 195, at 17 (positing that although certain groups have been
concerned with provisions of Act, general public has not expressed same concerns).
197 See Taylor, supra note 67, at 60 ("[T]he Patriot Act's most ardent critics were also
sure that the government had too much power to investigate terrorists before Sept. 11.").
See generally Patrick J. Fitzgerald, It Stripped Our Enemies of Protective Cover, CHI.
DAILY LAW BULL., Apr. 24, 2004, at 5 (arguing portions of Patriot Act assailed by its
critics are not all that groundbreaking); Ann Woolner, Conservatives and Liberals Agree
on Patriot Act: It's No Good, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP, Sept. 25, 2003 (noting that
"[m]uch of what is in the Patriot Act 'is the same ole, same ole'... but 'now somebody's
shined a flashlight on it."').
198 See Canestaro, supra note 188, at 134 (2003) ("Homeland defense and domestic
security was not a priority for the U.S. military before the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks."); McDonnell, supra note 187, at 355-56 (noting how Patriot Act and creation of
Homeland Security were responses to post September 11th demands to keep public safe");
see also Whitehead & Aden, supra note 56, at 1084 ("For the sake of greater security in
this post-September 11th climate, many Americans have expressed the willingness to
relinquish some of their freedoms.").
199 See Thomas D. Anderson, Patriot Act Protects Americans From Terrorism,
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Aug. 3, 2004, at 11A (noting "[a]s of May 5, 2004, the
Department of Justice has charged 310 defendants with criminal offenses as a result of
terrorism investigations since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and 179 of those defendants
have already been convicted.. .'3; Rhea Davis, Shelby Applauds USA Patriot Act; U.S.
Attorney Calls Law Powerful Tool, HOUS. CHRON., May 06, 2004, at 31 (speaking of U.S.
Attorney Michael Shelby's statements concerning view that Patriot Act has done more
than any other law in last quarter century to protect America); Rosenzweig, supra note
196, at 19A (proving why Patriot Act was vital to protect America's security).
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Attorney-client confidentiality is essential to promote fair and
effective legal representation. Protection of these
communications is highly important for a client's protection in
vulnerable situations. However, when a client uses the delicate
and respected communications to facilitate their own mad and
dangerous goals, putting the lives of others at risk, they must be
halted immediately. Therefore, the Bureau of Prisons regulation
is an essential and necessary tool for the Department of Justice
in times where terrorism and violence are imminent.
Unfortunately, the times when Americans lived with trust in
others has faded with the progression of the war. The enacted
legislation is simply a reaction to these feelings and the change
in technology in modern times. These regulations are
constitutional and promote an efficient balance between national
security and securing civil liberties, including the attorney-client
privilege.
